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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the phenomenology of time according to Martin Heidegger by taking 
a hermeneutical detour through Saint Augustine‘s Confessions and Paul‘s Letters to the 
Thessalonians. In order to adequately discuss Heidegger‘s notion of time we first require 
a historical mediation, i.e., to go back to and interpret the time phenomenon by engaging 
in a hermeneutical analysis. Therefore, the method that Heidegger adopts (the 
hermeneutical situation) is the method that I adopt throughout. It is important to note that 
I will be conducting my own phenomenology, i.e., I will be phenomenologizing in an 
attempt to better understand the time phenomenon in relation to factical life experience. 
This allows me to discuss Heidegger‘s account of primordial temporality, the foundations 
of which can be hermeneutically uncovered in the past. 
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Introduction: 
A phenomenology of time can be uncovered in the philosophical contemplations of past 
thinkers. Phenomenological tendencies reveal themselves to us when we revisit these past 
ideas with a particular comportment, i.e., by hermeneutically examining them. 
Alternatively, others have attempted to uncover and interpret the original intentions of an 
author when examining past ideas. Essentially, they strive to understand the work of past 
authors just as those authors would have understood themselves. This is the approach 
many historians and even philosophers opt for—to investigate the ideas and events of the 
past as accurately as possible. In order to achieve this accuracy, it is generally presumed 
that one must set aside one‘s own cultural, historical and even temporal situation. This 
approach is not necessarily false; however, it can restrict questioning and prevent certain 
inquiries from being opened up. Consequently, the phenomenon under investigation 
becomes concealed. This analysis, on the contrary, intends to unconceal the past 
phenomenological tendencies found within the works of Saint Augustine and St. Paul by 
adopting Heidegger‘s hermeneutical method. This will be accomplished by exploring the 
interpretations of time that Augustine and Paul put forth and in which the 
phenomenology of time can be revealed and discussed ―anew‖ via factical life 
experience.
1
  
                                                          
1
 Heidegger states that ―we need to understand the ancients anew.‖ Martin Heidegger, ―Wilhelm Dilthey‘s 
Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview,‖ from Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to 
Being and Time and Beyond, ed. John van Buren, trans. Charles Bambach (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2002), 176. Here I am insisting that, in order to properly understand Heidegger and the 
phenomenology of time, we need to adopt this same approach not only to his conception of time, but also to 
the conceptions of time put forth by Augustine and Paul. 
2 
 
The basic structure of Heidegger‘s hermeneutical method consists of a reduction, 
destruction and construction. The reductive part ‗goes back‘ to and outlines the dominant 
view with respect to the phenomenon in question. This dominant view is then delineated 
and allows for the unveiling of certain tendencies. Following from this is a revelation 
about the dominant interpretation, which has a tendency towards ―levelling down‖2 the 
phenomenon and thus revealing that there must be an alternative interpretation. Revealing 
that the interpretation is faulty (or at the very least does not capture the entire 
phenomenon) is the destructive part. In destroying the interpretation, by revealing the 
problems therein, one is able to open up the possibility for an alternative explanation of 
the phenomenon. This destruction of the dominant interpretation unconceals something 
new—these new features (of the phenomenon) are outlined and thus become the 
constructive part. Something new arises out of this process (something that allows the 
phenomenon to show itself from itself), i.e., a new encounter with the phenomenon is 
factically experienced.  
I will be providing a reduction, destruction and construction of the phenomenon 
of time as it appears in Augustine and Paul. My reconstruction of Heidegger‘s 
hermeneutical method consists of three parts: 1) Everyday Conception of Time (the 
Reduction); 2) Ecstatic Horizon (the Destruction); 3) Temporality (the Construction). I 
will be relying heavily on Heidegger‘s earlier works: from the early Freiburg and 
Marburg Periods, including Being and Time and The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. 
It is in Heidegger‘s early writings and lecture courses that he implements his 
                                                          
2
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Malden: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2006), 165. 
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hermeneutical method in order to uncover questions regarding the meaning of being and 
time. These early works also set the foundation for Heidegger‘s magnum opus, Being and 
Time, which demonstrates that his use of the hermeneutical method enabled him to 
realize and construct his own ontology and phenomenology. Some of the secondary 
sources that I will be referring to include John van Buren‘s The Early Heidegger: Rumor 
of the Hidden King, Theodore Kisiel‘s The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, S.J. 
McGrath‘s The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy: Phenomenology of the 
Godforsaken and The Companion to Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Religious Life edited 
by S.J. McGrath and Andrzej Wiercinski. It is important to note that I will be conducting 
my own phenomenology, i.e., I will be phenomenologizing in an attempt to better 
understand the time phenomenon in relation to factical life experience. This will allow 
me to discuss Heidegger‘s account of primordial temporality, the foundations of which 
can be hermeneutically uncovered in the past. I am not going to investigate these past 
ideas simply to emphasize the influence that they had on Heidegger—even though the 
historical influence is undeniable. Furthermore, I am not going to conduct a literary 
review or a critical assessment of Augustine and Paul‘s writings in order to understand 
them as they understood themselves. On the contrary, I am asserting that, in order to 
adequately discuss the phenomenology of time, we have to go back to thinkers like 
Augustine and Paul who can be regarded as ―proto-phenomenologists.‖3 Such an 
assertion necessarily means that I will be destroying the traditional interpretations of 
                                                          
3
 See Graeme Nicholson, ―The End of Time: Temporality in Paul‘s Letters to the Thessalonians,‖ from The 
Companion to Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Religious Life, ed. S.J. McGrath and Andrzej Wiercinski 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010), 226. 
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Augustine and Paul in order to unconceal a new interpretation—an interpretation that 
Augustine and Paul did not intend and that many scholars may not appreciate.  
My analysis will begin by discussing the significance of everydayness for 
Heidegger, followed by a reduction of the everyday concept of time. Book XI of 
Augustine‘s Confessions will be offered as the everyday concept of time, which I will 
deconstruct. The construction will then be attained by exemplifying Paul‘s Letters to the 
Thessalonians in which authentic and primordial temporality can be revealed. My reason 
for selecting Augustine‘s notion of time as opposed to Aristotle‘s is partially due to 
Heidegger‘s favorable reference to Augustine‘s treatment of time.4 Although Heidegger 
acknowledges that Aristotle‘s conception of time is ―more rigorous,‖ Augustine is 
nevertheless recognized to be one of the exceptions (along with Kant) to the everyday 
treatment of time.
5
 Heidegger detects something in Augustine‘s conception of time that, 
at least in some respect, breaks free from the tradition (despite it still remaining 
Aristotelian ―in principle‖).6 Therefore, the Augustinian conception of time ought to be 
examined more closely especially if he is considered to have treated ―the time 
phenomenon more originally‖ and is cited as being one of the exceptions to the common, 
everyday understanding of time.
7
 Furthermore, by examining Augustine, the continual 
influence that Aristotle‘s treatment of time has had on the history of philosophy can be 
clearly observed. As a result, a hermeneutical analysis of Augustine‘s notion of time 
                                                          
4
 See Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1988), 232: ―. . . Augustine sees some dimensions of the time phenomenon more 
originally.‖ 
5
 Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 232. I have included the full quote, which is on page 9 of 
my analysis. 
6
 Ibid., 237. 
7
 Ibid., 232. 
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reveals the Aristotelian influence and thus the everyday notion of time is again displayed 
(through Augustine). Rather than merely recapitulating Heidegger‘s treatment of the 
everyday notion of time, I shall conduct a new treatment that will lead to the same 
conclusion that Heidegger himself unveiled. Moreover, by exemplifying Paul‘s Letters 
and their connection to Heidegger in the construction, eschatology and kairological time 
can be properly exposed.  
It ought to be noted that other historical figures could have been utilized; 
however, I have selected Augustine and Paul due to their link to Christianity, which is a 
vital turning point for the investigation into the phenomenology of time. Heidegger‘s 
construction of the time phenomenon, it will be exposed, is an attitude towards time that 
originated in Judaism and became explicit with the rise of Christianity. Heidegger was 
thoroughly educated in the tenets of Christianity and, as a result, certain aspects of his 
philosophical thought reveal that influence.
8
 Hence, by examining the notions of time put 
forth by Augustine and Paul, the phenomenology of time in relation to Heidegger can be 
properly revealed. For it shall be demonstrated that others throughout history (e.g. 
Augustine and Paul), have dealt with factical life experience in connection with time and 
by illuminating these experiences the phenomenology of time (as well as Heidegger‘s 
project) can be understood ―anew.‖ Factical life experience—hermeneutically uncovered 
in the philosophical contemplations of past thinkers—proves to be the appropriate initial 
position to adopt when investigating human existence.  
                                                          
8
 See S.J. McGrath, The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy: Phenomenology of the Godforsaken 
(Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 8. See also John van Buren, The 
Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), 295. 
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Heidegger maintains that the being of the human being (Dasein) lives, for the 
most part, in average everydayness. Dasein is absorbed in the world of its concern, i.e., 
occupying itself with worldly tasks such as working, going to school, and even talking to 
one another. These everyday dealings enable Dasein to get on and navigate in the 
world—it is a basic constitution of the being of the human being. Average everydayness, 
however, is also responsible for concealing a more primordial notion of the being of the 
human being, viz., its ―ownmost‖ being gets covered up (much more on this later).9 This 
covering up has distorted various concepts and ideas throughout history, such as the 
notions of being and time, which have become ―equated with constant presence-at-
hand.‖10 The history of philosophy, especially metaphysics, is responsible for the notion 
that being is ―a-temporal‖—a ―presentifying absorption in the present.‖11 Being and time 
become reduced to what is ―now,‖ what Heidegger believes is a perpetuation of the 
Aristotelian model of time as ―now.‖12 Thus average everydayness is responsible for 
making time into what is constantly present—the concept of time gets lost in 
everydayness: 
The more that everyday Dasein becomes absorbed in shared concerns, the less 
time it has and the more precise the clocks become. . . . for using a clock means to 
turn all time into the present.
13
  
 
                                                          
9
 Heidegger, Being and Time, 355. 
10
 Ibid., 129. 
11
 See McGrath, Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy, 209 for ―a-temporal‖ and see Theodore Kisiel, 
The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 350 for 
―presentifying absorption in the present.‖ 
12
 See Heidegger, ―Wilhelm Dilthey‘s Research,‖ 170: ―This now is not, however, my now, but the ―now‖ 
of the clock that we can speak about together, the public now of being-with-one-another. This is the time of 
the everyone that belongs to publicness.‖ 
13
 Ibid. See also Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 261-263. 
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According to Heidegger, the history of philosophy, principally metaphysics, is guilty of 
this reduction of the concept of time to the present. In other words, time has been 
construed ―as a sequence of nows,‖ where the present or ―the now‖ is elevated.14 This 
way of conceiving time causes the past and the future to be forgotten. For Heidegger, the 
Scholastics are among the worst offenders—for they disseminate the notion of a creator, 
which causes the objects under investigation to be covered up even further. This analysis 
will show that mixing the notion of a creator with one‘s investigation into time leads to a 
misconstrual of the time phenomenon (as it reveals itself). Thus, by conjoining theology 
and philosophy, i.e., when philosophy becomes preoccupied with theology, a distortion of 
the time phenomenon occurs.
15
 Therefore, theology, according to Heidegger, is not the 
appropriate theme for philosophy—theology mixed with philosophy becomes 
ontotheology. As with average everydayness, ontotheology is responsible for the 
forgetfulness of being;
16
 however, average everydayness is not something we can 
necessarily avoid. Philosophers, on the other hand, can choose not to engage in 
ontotheological discourse, mainly because ontotheology seems almost akin to purposely 
hindering one‘s inquiries. Factical life experience is the proper theme for philosophy and 
ontotheology (the history of Western metaphysics) only distracts philosophy from 
investigating its proper theme.  
                                                          
14
 See Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1988), 257. 
15
 See McGrath, Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy, 208-209. 
16
 See Heidegger, Being and Time, 21-35 & 75. See also Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 
112-121 for a discussion of ―the inadequate foundation of the traditional treatment of the problem‖ of 
being. 
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This analysis intends to go back to the works of Paul (theology) and Augustine 
(ontotheology) in order to uncover a phenomenology of time therein. There is an 
important distinction to be made regarding factical life experience and religion. On the 
one hand, it could be concluded that religious life is factically transparent in philosophy. 
Such an assertion highlights the primacy of religion over philosophy—that philosophy 
derives from religion—or rather, that religion aids philosophical contemplation. 
Philosophy would then require religion in order to adequately discuss human existence, 
something that has been lacking in philosophy for some time. Heidegger‘s primordial 
temporality could be interpreted, in this case, as being derived (or even pilfered) from 
Christianity. On the other hand, it could be determined that there is something factically 
transparent about religion, i.e., that factical life experience is primary and can be 
uncovered in religion. Religion, in this case, is derived from factical life experience and, 
through philosophical contemplation, one is able to reveal the significance of religion. 
Thus philosophy becomes the appropriate modus operandi to understand human 
existence. Heidegger‘s primordial temporality would be interpreted as being primary (as 
the name suggests) and exemplifiable in Christianity. Although arguments can be made 
for both interpretations, the approach that I will adopt will be the one that Heidegger 
adopts—that religion (in particular Christianity) is derived from factical life experience.17 
Contrary to what Heidegger may suggest, this does not diminish the importance of 
religion; quite the reverse, it demonstrates that we have to include religion in our 
                                                          
17
 See McGrath, Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy, 205. 
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analyses. If factical life experience can be found in religion, then we ought to explore 
religion in order to gain better access to factical life experience.  
 In the 1920-21 lecture course, which includes ―Introduction to the 
Phenomenology of Religion,‖ Heidegger appears to commend Christian life experience, 
which helps one to comport oneself in a temporal manner. However, when Being and 
Time was published in 1927, all mention of theology in connection with factical life 
experience ceased. Many speculations have arisen regarding ―Heidegger‘s theological 
silence‖ and some of those speculations and criticisms will be outlined, albeit only in 
brief.
18
 It is indisputable that Heidegger adopts tenets of Christianity in his own ontology; 
however, he concurrently maintains that philosophy has to remain ―in principle 
atheistic.‖19 Pointing out such an apparent contradiction does not suggest that in adopting 
a certain structure one necessarily has to adopt all that that structure encompasses, i.e., 
the entire belief system. On the other hand, Heidegger‘s staunch opposition to theology 
and his adoption of it is rather perplexing. Max Scheler believed that Heidegger adopted 
a theological base for his thought, i.e., that he had pre-philosophical commitments in 
Being and Time (in the form of theology no less).
20
 Karl Löwith also accused 
Heidegger‘s Being and Time as being a ―disguised theology.‖21 Heidegger, it has been 
                                                          
18
 McGrath, Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy, ix. 
19
 Martin Heidegger, ―Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of the 
Hermeneutical Situation,‖ in Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond, trans. 
& ed. John Van Buren (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 121. 
20
 McGrath, Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy, 3-4 & 173. See also Jaromir Brejdak, ―Philosophia 
Crucis: The Influence of Paul on Heidegger‘s Phenomenology,‖ in A Companion to Heidegger’s 
Phenomenology of Religious Life, ed. S.J. McGrath and Andrzej Wiercinski (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010), 
211. See ibid., 213 for Heidegger‘s re-construction of Pauling anthropology in Being and Time. 
21
 Kisiel, Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 423. See also McGrath, Early Heidegger and Medieval 
Philosophy, 22 & 173. See quote by Rudolf Bultmann from ibid., 185: ―Above all Martin Heidegger‘s 
10 
 
asserted, has a ―hidden theological agenda,‖ which can be observed with his use of terms 
such as ―falling,‖ ―guilt,‖ ―resoluteness‖ etc.22 It has been suggested that Heidegger‘s 
lack of acknowledgment regarding the ―theological origin‖ of his thought was 
specifically to avoid using ―Christian terminology.‖23 Even the term kairology, which 
Heidegger used in 1922-23, was no longer employed—despite the idea of kairology 
shaping division two of Being and Time.
24
 
For whatever reasons, some perhaps unconscious or simply inadvertent, 
Heidegger in his final draft, contrary to the previous draft, is subtly downplaying, 
disguising, or otherwise distorting some of the deepest roots of his thought.
25
 
 
Perhaps Heidegger decided that Christianity ―for its own sake‖ was not central to his 
thought, but rather its methodology and structure were exemplary and worth 
appropriating.
26
 Hence, upon adopting said methodology and structure, he did not feel the 
need to discuss religion anymore. His primary goal was to ―develop the formal 
schematism of time which is most appropriate.‖ 27 Thus, if the formal schematism that is 
most appropriate derives from early Christian texts, then that is the schematism he must 
use. Heidegger‘s ―de-Christianized‖ version of the appropriated terms (resoluteness, 
authenticity, guilt etc.), as suggested above, might be intended to reveal that these notions 
were actually originally appropriated by Christians.
28
 In other words, these notions and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
existential analysis of Dasein appears to be nothing more than a secular philosophical presentation of the 
New Testament insight into human existence.‖  
22
 Ibid., 173. 
23
 Brejdak, ―Philosophia Crucis,‖  211. 
24
 See Kisiel, Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 421-423. 
25
 Ibid., 422. 
26
 Gerhard Ruff, ―Present History: Reflections on Martin Heidegger‘s Approach to Early Christianity,‖ in A 
Companion to Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Religious Life, ed. S.J. McGrath and Andrzej Wiercinski 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010), 233. 
27
 Kisiel, Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 423. 
28
 For ―de-Christianized‖ see McGrath, Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy, 22. 
11 
 
this formal schematism is representative of and grounded in our way of being-in-the-
world, our existence.
29
 Christianity would be investigated, therefore, in order to 
unconceal and return to these original ideas, which are located in the being of the human 
being.
30
 Heidegger, therefore, adopts and promotes these notions and, in particular, the 
meaning of the terms kairology and eschatology (through not the terms themselves) 
throughout Being and Time. This allows him to answer the main question regarding the 
meaning of being and time. 
Heidegger demonstrates how our common way of conceiving time (such as clock 
time) is responsible for concealing this more primordial notion of temporality—the 
temporality that is the condition of the possibility of being. The possibility of Dasein 
reckoning with time and ―using up its own time, the time allotted‖ to it, depends on 
primordial temporality.
31
 Everyday time usage is derived from primordial temporality, 
which is our ability to recognize phenomena such as ‗before,‘ ‗at this moment,‘ ‗after,‘ 
etc.
32
 Without the ability to identify instances of ‗before,‘ ‗at this moment‘ and ‗after,‘ 
Dasein would not be able to navigate in the world. Indeed, the possibility of language 
would cease. In order to arrive at his conclusion, Heidegger appropriates two essential 
ideas—one from the Greeks and the other from the Christians. Beginning with the 
Greeks, Heidegger was able to unveil (what he believes is) the origin of the term aletheia, 
which is not defined as truth, but rather as unconcealment. Heidegger actually 
                                                          
29
 Ibid., 206. 
30
 See ibid., 205 for ―. . . philosophy reclaiming from Christianity what is rightfully its own.‖ 
31
 Piotr Hoffman, ―Dasein and ―Its‖ Time,‖ in A Companion to Heidegger, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark 
A. Wrathall (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 330. 
32
 See Heidegger‘s discussion of ―Temporality [Temporalität] and a priori of being: The phenomenological 
method of ontology‖ in Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 324-330. 
12 
 
unconcealed this meaning of the term aletheia after hermeneutically destroying its 
common origin and meaning. 
It is not for the sake of etymology that I stubbornly translate the name aletheia as 
unconcealment. . . . Rather, aletheia, unconcealment thought as opening, first 
grants the possibility of truth.
33
 
 
Hence, Heidegger applies this method of aletheia to time by actually destroying the 
common conception of time and thus unconcealing primordial temporality as a result. 
The Greeks‘ conception of time, on the other hand, is rather problematic for Heidegger 
and it is understandable, therefore, that he turned to Christian eschatological texts. What 
is most intriguing, however, is the connection between truth and time for Heidegger: 
using the Greeks aletheia—albeit in a newly constructed way—and applying its basic 
methodology to our common view of time, Heidegger ends up with a view that is akin to 
Christianity‘s eschatological time.34 Heidegger ―positively appropriates‖ two historical 
views—aletheia from the Greeks and eschatology from the Christians—in order to 
ground his notion of primordial temporality. The question of the meaning of being and an 
inquiry into beings is only possible if there is already a notion of primordial temporality 
that allows for there to be such questioning in the first place. As stated above, language is 
only possible and, by extension, questioning is only possible provided that we have 
primordial temporality. Before Dasein can engage in any inquiry (whether it be 
philosophical, scientific or historical), it must have a notion of primordial temporality. 
Before Dasein can even engage/live in the world (whether that engagement/life be 
authentic or inauthentic), it must have a notion of primordial temporality. 
                                                          
33
 Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper, 1972), 68-70. 
34
 See Kisiel, Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 422. 
13 
 
It shall be argued that in order to adequately discuss the phenomenology of time, 
one has to hermeneutically uncover ideas from past thinkers, namely that ―the existential-
ontological constitution of Dasein‘s totality is grounded in temporality.‖35 Therefore, by 
going back to Augustine‘s extension of the soul (distentio anime) and the factical life of 
Christians (exemplified by Paul), Heidegger‘s primordial temporality can be properly 
revealed. Since these two Christians possess a phenomenology of time, albeit 
unbeknownst to them, it is imperative that we return to these past ideas in order to move 
the analysis forward. Likewise, it is only by starting from our present situation that we 
can make this return in the manner that we do; uncovering something in these past ideas 
that can modify our present analysis. As a result, the reliability of Heidegger‘s project 
leading to primordial temporality can be ascertained and thus more credence can be 
granted to his phenomenological account of time. Where future analyses into the 
phenomenology of time will go can only be determined provided that such analyses allow 
past and present discussions to reveal themselves. Consequently, looking ahead, future 
analyses will modify this present and these past examinations into the phenomenology of 
time.  
  
                                                          
35
 Heidegger, Being and Time, 488. 
14 
 
Chapter 1: Everyday Conception of Time (the Reduction) 
It is important to reveal what everydayness is and how it constitutes Dasein—in 
particular, the ways in which Dasein lives in and engages with the world. For Heidegger, 
this everyday engagement with the world results in Dasein and Dasein‘s inquiries to be 
―levelled down:‖36 
So it is by looking at the most pronounced examples of Dasein‘s autonomous self-
interpretation that we can lay bare Dasein‘s discoverature in light of its tendency 
for concealment. Public opinion and curiosity are modes of discoverature brought 
about by the being of Dasein itself in the shape of everydayness.
37
    
The ―examples of Dasein‘s autonomous self-interpretation‖ are made available to us by 
revealing and exploring the ―modes of discoverature,‖ which are simultaneously 
concealing. The ―tendency for concealment‖ applies to the being of Dasein that 
conceals/covers up its ownmost being and, consequently, to the inquiries that Dasein 
concerns itself with.
38
 These inquiries and their subsequent conclusions—motivated by 
―public opinion and curiosity‖—have been concealing as opposed to revealing the 
―question of the meaning of being‖ and time.39 This everyday and ordinary way of 
investigating and understanding these concepts, especially the concept of time, ―has 
persisted from Aristotle to Bergson and even later.‖40 Dilthey, however, may be 
recognized by Heidegger as being an exception—for he was seeking to discern an 
understanding of ―human self-knowledge‖ not conceptually, but rather by means of a 
                                                          
36
 Martin Heidegger, The Concept of Time, trans. Ingo Farin with Alex Skinner (New York: Continuum, 
2011), 33. 
37
 Heidegger, Concept of Time, 33. 
38
 See Heidegger‘s discussion of ―semblance‖ and Dasein ―bringing itself into deception‖ in Martin 
Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, trans. Theodore Kisiel (Indianapolis: Indiana Unievrsity Press, 
1992), 260. 
39
 Heidegger, Being and Time, 1; Heidegger, Concept of Time, 33. 
40
 Heidegger, Being and Time, 39. 
15 
 
―vital questioning.‖41 He acknowledged ―certain structures in life,‖ however, he did not 
go far enough and pose the correct questions concerning the being of the human being 
and ―thus his own intentions remained unrealized.‖42 It is therefore important to see how 
the entire history of philosophy, including Dilthey, has continually bypassed and 
concealed the question of the meaning of being and time.  
This tendency to cover over is nothing other than Dasein‘s flight from itself into 
publicness, a flight that has important consequences for understanding the 
phenomenon of time.
43
 
 
  Thus a new account—namely a phenomenological one—is required in order to 
advance ―Dilthey‘s own position‖ and, accordingly, inquire into the questions that have 
been continually concealed.
44
 Furthermore, before an investigation into the phenomenon 
of time can occur, the ways in which these questions have been covered over must be 
revealed. Heidegger believes that time has to be understood ―as the reality of our own 
selves‖ and that our everyday way of dealing with time thus characterizes the being of 
Dasein, namely, as inauthentic being-with-one-another.
45
 In fact, Heidegger begins his 
own analyses by revealing the importance of the ―customary‖ and everyday interpretation 
of the phenomenon under investigation.
46
 Heidegger‘s examination of time, therefore, 
begins by first conducting his hermeneutical method on the everyday interpretation of 
time, which he achieves by using Aristotle as the exemplar. It is in this examination that 
                                                          
41
 Heidegger, ―Wilhelm Dilthey‘s Research,‖ 153-155. 
42
 Ibid., 158, 162. See also Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, 18.  
43
 Heidegger, ―Wilhelm Dilthey‘s Research,‖ 165. 
44
 Ibid., 159. 
45
 Ibid., 172. 
46
 Ibid., 172. See also Ibid., 162: ―We will attempt, phenomenologically, to set forth characteristics of the 
being of human being and to see human being just as it shows itself from itself in its everyday existence 
[Dasein].‖ My emphasis. 
16 
 
Heidegger reduces, destroys and constructs the everyday conception of time as it is 
depicted by Aristotle. Therefore, an outline of everydayness shall be provided followed 
by a brief discussion of the everyday notion of time that has been precipitated by 
Aristotle. How Heidegger deals with this everyday interpretation of time—the method 
that he adopts to assess it—will also be discussed and exemplified in this section. 
1.1. Heidegger’s notion of ‘everydayness’ and the everyday notion of time 
How and why Dasein is absorbed in everydayness is not due to some ―event that merely 
happens to Dasein‖ (as if by accident), but it is a basic constitution of Dasein.47  Dasein is 
in-the-world and it is precisely this world (and the activities that are taken up in that 
world) that Dasein is concerned with. Being concerned means that Dasein ―become[s] 
caught up in its own worries‖ and finds itself in a ―fallen state.‖48 Dasein deals with 
things in the world out of concern and as a result, it falls away from itself. This falling 
away occurs when Dasein is faced with a particular threat.
49
 That which threatens Dasein 
is not fear—for fear is precisely fear of something encountered in the world, e.g., a fear 
of heights, a fear of spiders, etc. The threat that Heidegger is referring to is not something 
that is encountered in the world, but rather one that is located in the being of Dasein.
50
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Dasein‘s being-in-the-world is lived, for the most part, in the security of average 
everydayness, which, as stated above, conceals. Everydayness is responsible for covering 
up that which is threatening, namely, it covers up its ultimate possibility.
51
 Thus, the 
ultimate possibility of Dasein threatens and causes Dasein to flee into ―the familiar, 
secure, average, public everydayness. . . .‖52 This occurs because Dasein exists in 
possibility; it is always ―what it can be.‖53 In everydayness, Dasein‘s ―what it can be‖—
its possibility—is worldly. In other words, Dasein‘s possibility is what Dasein strives for, 
e.g. to get a job, to have a family, to retire, etc. Possibility in the everyday sense is one‘s 
future goals, that towards which one is striving.  On the other hand, Dasein‘s ultimate 
possibility is not a worldly occasion or goal, but ―is the possibility of the absolute 
impossibility of Dasein,‖ viz. death.54 Death is threatening and is what Dasein flees in the 
face of, which results in Dasein becoming immersed in the world of its concern.
55
 Thus, 
in everydayness and in the world of its concern, Dasein lives its death by fleeing from it. 
The act of dying is not the problem, but rather, it is living with death in the present that is 
the cause for concern.
56
 Dasein therefore has different ways of ―standing before its 
death‖—in everydayness death is dealt with ―indifferently,‖ i.e., it is ―thrust aside.‖57 
(Another way of standing before death, authentically, will be expounded upon in the 
constructive part of this hermeneutical analysis, which is on pages 58-72). Dasein, in 
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caring for itself in everydayness, evades death as a possibility and focuses solely on the 
things that it still intends to do.
58
 It is important to note that Heidegger does not hold that 
Dasein, at some point in time, realizes its ownmost being (its eventual death) and then 
flees from it into everydayness. On the contrary, everydayness is a basic constitution of 
Dasein and not something that simply comes about or develops, as if it were in some way 
avoidable.
59
 Fleeing in the face of one‘s ownmost being (death) has shielded Dasein, it 
has comforted and soothed Dasein. On the other hand, it has also prevented Dasein from 
inquiring into and uncovering the phenomenon that is closest to it.  
Perhaps everydayness can be discerned in both a positive and a negative way; it is 
positive in that it is how we are for the most part, how we ‗get on‘ and navigate in the 
world of our concern. By investigating how we navigate in the world—how we engage 
with objects ready-to-hand and other Daseins—we are able to acquire a positive depiction 
of the being of human being. It is negative, however, in that we become absorbed in 
everydayness, which causes us to forget our ownmost being. Likewise, it causes our 
inquiries to be absorbed with these navigations and engagements (everydayness), thus 
making it even more difficult to attain original and genuine access to the phenomena. 
Interestingly, by discerning everydayness in such a manner, we can see a double instance 
of forgetting, i.e., when lost in everydayness we forget our ownmost being, but when 
faced with our ownmost being we forget everydayness. Of course, forgetting 
everydayness opens up the possibility for alternative lines of inquiry regarding factical 
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life experience, which is the appropriate theme of philosophy.
60
 Thus, forgetting 
everydayness (or at least casting it aside) becomes the appropriate and, in turn, the 
positive path to follow for the sake of philosophical inquiry. It is the forgetting of our 
ownmost being, however, that is the reason an adequate investigation into being has 
never occurred—for it continually ―covers itself up.‖61  
. . . time needs to be explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding 
of being, and in terms of temporality as the being of Dasein, which understands 
being. This task as a whole requires that the conception of time thus obtained 
shall be distinguished from the way in which it is ordinarily understood.
62
 
 
Thus, the inquiries that have been put forth in the past have continually overlooked the 
phenomena that are closest to Dasein, the meaning of being and time.
63
   
Heidegger‘s discussion of the everyday concept of time was accomplished by 
using Aristotle, for he believes that Aristotle was able to express ―in clear conceptual 
form . . . the common understanding of time.‖64 It is therefore necessary to cite what 
Heidegger reveals about Aristotle with respect to his interpretation of time:  
It can be said that subsequent times did not get essentially beyond the stages of 
Aristotle‘s treatment of the problem [concerning time]—apart from a few 
exceptions in Augustine and Kant, who nevertheless retain in principle the 
Aristotelian concept of time.
65
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Book IV of Aristotle‘s Physics reveals that ―time and movement always correspond to 
each other.‖66 Aristotle does not go so far as to assert that time is motion—for he makes it 
quite clear that what gets measured, gets measured in time, however, that which gets 
measured can also be at rest.
67
 Therefore, time is something that belongs to movement 
and every movement occurs in time. Aristotle seems to have developed a reciprocal 
relationship between time and motion—for ―we measure the movement by the time, but 
also the time by the movement.‖68 Aristotle also discusses notions of before and after and 
their relation to time itself: what is before and what is after can only be deemed ‗before‘ 
and ‗after‘ so long as there is a ‗now‘ to divide them.69 The now for Aristotle becomes a 
―boundary,‖ it is an ―attribute‖ of time (just like before and after), however, it is 
considered to be the link between the two.
70
 It is not that time is the now, but rather, that 
time is divided, measured (and potentially understood) by the now.
71
 Heidegger examines 
this in far greater detail; however, it is essentially this idea that supplies Heidegger with 
his conclusion: that Aristotle‘s interpretation of time, revealed ―as a sequence of nows,‖ 
―corresponds to the common prescientific understanding of time.‖72  
Even today it is usually maintained that the past is no longer and the future is not 
yet, thereby elevating and privileging the present. This is due to our tendency to count, 
measure and deal with time in a way that suits our everyday activities. This comportment 
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towards time—this construal of time—requires the use of clocks to mark the passage of 
events in order to act in the world of our concern. Aristotle‘s interpretation of time, which 
Heidegger reduces and which reveals this comportment, is only an ―initial approach.‖73 
The time phenomenon requires further interpretation, i.e., a destruction that can highlight 
these everyday tendencies and lead to the time phenomenon as it reveals itself to us. 
Heidegger is then able to assert something about the time phenomenon: the features of 
this common, everyday view of time ―[point] back to an original time, temporality‖ and it 
is this ―original time‖ that has allowed for the everyday interpretation to arise.74 Much 
more could be said about Aristotle, especially in connection with Heidegger; however, 
the purpose here is to set the foundation for this analysis, i.e., to introduce how Heidegger 
assessed Aristotle in order to foreshadow how I intend to assess Augustine.  
As mentioned above, the use of clocks is vital to our daily lives; however, such an 
activity (one that is so prevalent) is not investigated and yet, it is presupposed in these 
everyday interpretations. Our ability to reckon with time, to have time, to take time, etc., 
is never really explored.
75
  
Why are there clocks? Because everyday life wants to have the course of the 
world available in the ―now.‖ Now and then, and then, and then. . . . Nothing but 
more nows that one wants to make available in the realm of the everyone. To 
make these nows universally accessible requires a clock.
76
 
 
By uncovering and investigating these time phenomena, which are revealed to be taken 
for granted in the everyday interpretation (but that are so essential to our everyday 
dealings), Heidegger is then able to construct a new understanding of time.  Before 
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Heidegger reveals his own interpretation (whether it be his interpretation of time or truth 
or being) he has to begin by first going back to the common or everyday interpretation 
that dominates philosophical inquiry.  
My method, like Heidegger‘s, will begin with the everyday interpretation of time. 
Likewise, facticity will be taken as the initial position, which will determine my approach 
to Book XI of Augustine‘s Confessions.77 Book XI titled ―Time and Eternity‖ will be 
scrutinized and hermeneutically investigated in order to uncover something new in his 
views on time. Augustine and likewise Augustinian scholars may not consider 
Augustine‘s notion of time to be phenomenological. However, as stated above, upon 
further examination and with a particular comportment (a comportment that should be 
acknowledged), phenomenological tendencies reveal themselves. This comportment is 
one that reflects our current perspective—our present place in history. Our perspective 
recognizes the pervasiveness of phenomenological inquiry, which drastically affects our 
interpretations of past ideas in philosophy. In other words, our current temporal situation 
is one that includes phenomenology as one of our philosophical methods. Having 
knowledge of phenomenology enables us to go back to past ideas in which we can 
uncover early forms of phenomenological expression (or ―proto-phenomenology‖).78 
Uncovering early inklings of phenomenology in the past does not suggest that such 
inklings were purposely constructed or even recognized by the authors themselves. Our 
present temporal situation (our knowledge) is what is being implemented when we 
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examine the past ideas. Therefore, by interpreting Augustine in this manner—a manner 
that is starkly different from how Augustine himself viewed his work—opens up the 
possibility for something new to reveal itself, viz. that Augustine‘s account of time has 
phenomenological inklings.  
Heidegger insists that those scholars who intentionally try not to read anything 
into past ideas are inevitably ―caught in the act of reading something into‖ those same 
ideas.
79
 In order to get ―the past to speak to us‖ we need to be aware of and formulate our 
―initial position of looking,‖ our ―direction of looking‖ and our ―scope of looking.‖80 
These three ways of looking are temporally conditioned, i.e., they are recognized and 
determined by us and influenced by where we find ourselves in a particular time.
81
 To 
simply state that one requires an ―initial position‖, ―direction‖ and ―scope of looking‖ at 
an object under investigation may sound similar to a construction of a scientific method, 
i.e., making clear the parameters and regulations regarding one‘s investigative method. 
On the contrary, hermeneutics is a ―phenomenological explication of human existing 
itself.‖82 It is not solely about understanding past ideas inasmuch as it is about attempting 
to understand the nature of ourselves as we are in the process of examining those ideas. 
Heidegger emphasizes that the being who asks the question of being (the inquirer), in that 
very act of questioning, reveals his/her own being: 
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The very asking of this question is an entity‘s mode of being; and as such it gets 
its essential character from what is inquired about—namely, Being. This entity 
which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the 
possibilities for its being, we shall denote the term ―Dasein.‖83 
 
Therefore our way of examining Dasein must be by going back to how others have 
inquired, i.e., what sort of questions Dasein has posed in the past and how Dasein 
currently stands in relation to that past (from out of a present). Therefore, we can never 
rid ourselves of the prejudices of our present perspectives in an effort to view ancient 
ideas and thoughts in ways that the ancients would have viewed them, for such a feat is 
dubious.  
In order to show, practically, how problematic it is to be oblivious of your own 
position/direction/scope of looking—the ―how‖ of being interpreted84—an example from 
the field of anthropology shall be provided.
85
 Anthropologists and, in particular, 
ethnographers will live with another society (usually an indigenous group) in an attempt 
to study and understand them and their culture. Ethnographers strive to leave their biases, 
prejudices and ethnocentricities aside for the sake of immersing themselves in the cultural 
ways of an ―other.‖ They actually attempt to attain a different perspective—to absorb 
themselves in the everyday existence of the other by performing the activities that the 
other engages in—however, this is not easily accomplished. The researchers will always 
be referring back to their knowledge base, especially during the publication of their 
findings. The self-other dichotomy is not something that can be overcome so easily, 
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particularly when a researcher (despite having the best intentions) infiltrates the cultural 
space of an other. The mere presence of the ‗alien‘ researcher modifies the peoples‘ 
behaviours and, consequently, the results of the ethnography. The best that an 
anthropologist can hope for is not to prejudge, censor or condemn the other, which is a 
fundamental element in the training of anthropologists today. It is therefore vital for 
anthropologists to be aware of what they are bringing to the interpretation, i.e., the 
position, direction and scope of looking and an awareness of what is mere observation 
verses what is supplementary explanation.
86
 For such explanations have had terrible 
consequences for the history of anthropological theory and, as such, the cultural ways of 
the other have been continually covered up as a result of the unacknowledged 
presuppositions of the researcher.
87
 Looking back to ancient thoughts and texts, not only 
is the world extremely different, but we are faced with the problem of language and 
translation. Therefore, it seems that endeavouring to understand the ancients and their 
ideas in the exact same way that they understood themselves and their ideas is rather 
futile: 
The task is to gain a real and original relationship to history, which is to be 
explicated from out of our own historical situation and facticity. At issue is what 
the sense of history can signify for us, so that the ―objectivity‖ of the historical 
―in itself‖ disappears. History exists only from out of a present.88 
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The possibility that now past philosophical research will have an effect on the 
future of research can never consist in its results as such, but rather is rooted in 
the primordiality of questioning which is attained and concretely worked out in 
each particular case, through which past research can become a present in ever-
new ways as a model that evokes problems.
89
 
Therefore, we bring something to the ideas of the past—our interpretation becomes an 
essential part of the past ideas that we examine.
90
 
Past ideas also help us recognize where our current tendencies—in how we 
construe a problem—come from. In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger 
examines the problem of time, which is very familiar to us, but quickly turns into 
something ―strange and puzzling‖ once we try to clarify it.91 This difficulty of clarifying 
time is something that Heidegger takes from Augustine‘s Confessions, which Heidegger 
quotes.
92
 It ought to be noted that Augustine, like Heidegger, also takes this ―puzzling‖ 
problem of time from the past, in particular from Plotinus who makes a similar claim.
93
 
Thus time is something that is so close to us—we reckon with, count, and deal with it 
regularly—yet we seem to be at a loss when attempting to scrutinize it and ―make it 
clear.‖94 This can be a possible reason why questions into the meaning of being and time 
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have been bypassed and forgotten—even considered to be ―superfluous.‖95 Heidegger has 
a solution to this problem, however, and that is to begin with the common, everyday 
understanding of time, which ―reached conceptual expression‖ in the early days of 
philosophical inquiry.
96
  
As has been stated previously, Heidegger commended Augustine for his account 
of time, which appeared to break from tradition. Heidegger, however, came to this 
conclusion once he uncovered the common, everyday interpretation of Augustine‘s 
Confessions provided by Ernst Troeltsch, Adolf von Harnack and Wilhelm Dilthey.
97
 He 
demonstrated the ―motivational centers‖ for all three interpretations, which further 
conceal the object under investigation, viz., Augustine‘s Confessions.98 After destroying 
the dominant interpretations, which categorized the Confessions as an autobiography, 
Heidegger was able to provide his own interpretation; he viewed Augustine‘s 
Confessions as being ―a three-part interpretation of the historical self.‖99 Heidegger saw 
that Augustine‘s account of time, in particular, was linked to the soul and, as such, was 
akin to an expression of factical life experience.
100
 Augustine‘s extension of the soul 
(distentio anime), for example, allows for the possibility of the experience of ―memory,‖ 
―immediate awareness‖ and ―expectation.‖101 By going back to his predecessors‘ 
philosophical conceptions of time, Heidegger was able to acquire a ―portrayal of the time 
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phenomenon.‖102 It is this portrayal that Heidegger reduces and then destroys, which 
reveals something that was not previously there, i.e., something that was concealed by the 
common, everyday understanding is unconcealed. That which becomes unconcealed will 
enable Heidegger to make time ―clear‖ and define what primordial temporality is. This is 
the method that I shall now adopt. 
1.2: Everyday conception of time exemplified by Saint Augustine 
In Book XI: ―Time and Eternity,‖ Augustine begins, as in most sections of his 
Confessions, by pleading to God for assistance in acquiring knowledge: 
Lord, eternity is yours, so you cannot be ignorant of what I tell you. Your vision 
of occurrences in time is not temporally conditioned. Why then do I set before 
you an ordered account of so many things? It is certainly not through me that you 
know them.
103
  
 
Augustine has presupposed that God is outside of our temporal structure—God is not 
bound by time in the same way that finite beings are. This is how Augustine can account 
for our way of experiencing time, which is fundamentally different from how God 
experiences time. Finite beings live in successive moments whereas God lives outside 
time and can see all moments simultaneously. The other problem for Augustine, 
however, is how heaven and earth were created, noting that if they exist (which they 
obviously do) then they must have been made. He justifies this view by stating that 
heaven and earth did not always exist; for something that ―was not the case‖ but now ―is‖ 
must indicate that it was ―subject to change and variation.‖104 This is markedly similar to 
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Aristotle‘s notion of the unmoved mover who caused ―eternal motion,‖ which 
precipitated the emergence/movement of finite things.
105
 Even more interesting, however, 
is its similarity to the presocratic philosophers‘ struggle to comprehend how an infinite or 
indefinite substance accounts for the possibility of definite things coming into 
existence.
106
 Equally for Augustine, it is apparent that heaven and earth could not have 
created themselves—they did not already exist ―to be able to make‖ themselves.107 The 
question now arises: how did God make heaven and earth and what ―material‖ or 
―equipment‖ did he use to make them?108  
Augustine reveals how humans make things by already having at their disposal 
certain materials with which they can use to make other material objects. This is certainly 
not how God created heaven and earth. For humans, the material that they need to be able 
to make things already exists, but for God, no material or tools were available prior to 
God‘s creation of them.109 Augustine concludes that heaven and earth were therefore 
created when God ―spoke‖ them—by God‘s word he spoke them into existence.110 This 
speaking, however, appears to be rather complicated: for how exactly did the speech 
occur?  This is where time becomes an issue for Augustine who pleads to know how the 
speech ―moved:‖ 
The voice is past and done with; it began and is ended. The syllables sounded and 
have passed away, the second after the first, the third after the second, and so on 
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in order until, after all the others, the last one came, and after the last silence 
followed.
111
 
 
Augustine confirms that the voice had to have come through a ―movement,‖ which was 
in the service of the Lord‘s will, but which was ―itself temporal.‖112 The Aristotelian 
influence is apparent here; the idea of movement in connection with time figures 
prominently.  
The problem for Augustine is that the utterance had to have taken time to convey 
the message so that heaven and earth could be created. Due to this, Augustine believes 
that something else had to have been created prior to heaven and earth. Thus temporal 
changes were already required in order for the message of the utterance to be sent. How 
could something else exist before heaven and earth?
113
 Only something that was created 
by God could have existed prior to heaven and earth, but this something could not have 
been made in the same manner as heaven and earth, viz., with words. Therefore, the 
words must have been ―spoken eternally,‖ otherwise if the words followed in a 
successive manner, then time and alteration would exist prior and there could be no 
eternity.
114
  
And in this way he is the beginning because, unless he were constant, there would 
be no fixed point to which we could return . . . . Wisdom is the beginning, and in 
that beginning you made heaven and earth.
115
 
 
Something constant (God) is responsible for creating movement and alteration (time), 
which is the condition for the possibility of finite things coming into existence. Augustine 
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has demonstrated that before heaven and earth, time had to exist. Time, however, did not 
exist as some eternal thing which has always existed, but rather as something that came 
into existence out of the eternal word. This eternal realm, out of which the eternal word 
arose, had to always and already exist, otherwise it would not be eternal and, furthermore, 
there would be no eternity or immortality.
116
 Time was created by God and seems to have 
been necessary in order for God to be able to create heaven and earth—where these 
created things are affected by movement and alteration. Augustine has framed the 
problem of time as being something that we fret about due to our inability to experience 
the eternal; we are restricted to experiencing everything in time.
117
 We change and grow 
but God ―subsists in simultaneity‖ and there could not have been any time prior to 
God.
118
  
Augustine appears to struggle with the idea that time appears differently to 
humans than it does to God. As part of the reduction, it is important to discuss (in brief) 
the different interpretations of Augustine‘s account of time. This will allow me to 
properly explicate and reduce the Augustinian perspective on time and to reveal how 
contemporary scholars have grasped his account—perpetuating the everyday notion of 
time as a result.  What does it mean to have two different times, one for humans 
(subjective) and one for God (objective)? Is it even appropriate to discuss two distinct 
times in connection with Augustine, i.e., subjective vs. objective, or, put differently, the 
constructed time that humans experience vs. the objective time that God observes 
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(alteration vs. simultaneity)?
119
 There are different ways to interpret the consequences of 
Augustine‘s notion of time. The subjectivist interpretation, held by prominent figures like  
Bertrand Russell, Etienne Gilson, and R. A. Markus, declares that time possesses no 
reality (or objectivity), but is merely a ―construction of the mind.‖120 Another 
interpretation, however, supports the notion that time is in fact real, but the 
―sequentialization‖ of time is ―mind-dependent.‖121 Supporters of such a notion, such as 
Robert Jordan, Hugh M. Lacey, and Wilma Gundersdorf von Jess,
122
 state that humans 
live in time and ―know things temporally,‖ but God exists ―outside of time‖ and ―knows 
eternally.‖123 A clear tension can be observed—what is the relation between time and 
eternity?  
As revealed above, Augustine holds that time was created out of the eternal and 
thus the eternal is in some way responsible for the existence of change and alteration: 
. . . dealing with the problem of the difference between objectivity and 
subjectivity . . . . For Augustine, this amounts to an answer to the paradox of how 
eternity and temporality are compatible, or how the interaction between God and 
God‘s creation is possible.124 
 
God used time to create heaven and earth. Time was needed in order for heaven and earth 
to come into existence and thus heaven and earth are in time (created), but God remains 
outside time (eternal). Importantly, God created time (from outside time) and then 
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―speaks in time‖ to create heaven and earth.125 It can be argued that created things and 
God are exclusively connected through time and in order to overcome the problem of 
time and eternity, Augustine has to provide a genesis of time to show the obvious link 
between the two. God required time in order to create heaven and earth, thus time is that 
which links God (the eternal) to us (the creation), which can account for the possibility of 
there being interaction between God and God‘s creation. This link between eternity and 
time has been interpreted in a way where time is actually among the ―fallen parts of a 
universal whole.‖126 In this interpretation, time is construed as a movement away from 
the eternal and hence a ―diminution‖ of the eternal.127 This movement away from the 
eternal is consistent with Augustine‘s explanation of how God created time in which 
movement and alteration reside and opened up the possibility for the eternal word to 
speak heaven and earth into existence. 
 Now that Augustine has demonstrated his genesis of time, he moves on to discuss 
exactly what time is.
128
 How are the past, present and future to be explained? Augustine 
begins by explaining that the past ceases to exist and the present exists, but only for the 
sake of passing out of existence, and the future is yet to exist.
129
 Thus, the present is 
conceived as ―being the only real time‖ despite its eventual annihilation when it becomes 
past.
130
 Augustine therefore explores the notion of the present with the intent of 
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understanding when the present is actually present. This seems to be quite polemical, he 
is personally addressing Zeno and engaging with his paradoxes—for he brings up the 
impossibility of the present in virtually every circumstance. A century could not exist 
because it can be broken up into decades, which in turn cannot exist because a decade, 
too, can be broken up into years and so on.
131
 This can occur all the way down to the time 
that ―cannot be divided into even the smallest instantaneous moments,‖ which would be 
all that constitutes the present.
132
 This problem of the present is one that Augustine will 
overcome by introducing the extension of the soul; however, as explained above, this 
notion is solely related to human beings and not to God.  Thus, in order for us to 
understand time, we have to analyze how we measure and live in time. This is the crucial 
conclusion that will be expanded upon further, especially as it relates to our initial 
position of looking and, by extension, to Heidegger‘s primordial temporality.  
The elucidation (reduction) of Augustine‘s conception of time has revealed that in 
his conception there are many tendencies that are consistent with the common, everyday 
interpretation of time. Hence, prior to an explication of Augustine‘s extension of the soul, 
this analysis will bring these tendencies in Augustine‘s conception of time under scrutiny. 
It is only by discounting these tendencies that lead to the everyday notion of time that the 
more appropriate account of time can emerge (liberated from those tendencies). 
Augustine‘s extension of the soul can therefore emerge after the destruction has taken 
place; the extension of the soul will act as a connecting component that links the 
destruction and the construction. It is in Augustine‘s idea of ―extendedness‖ that the 
                                                          
131
 Augustine, Confessions, 232. 
132
 Ibid., 232. 
35 
 
construction of the time phenomenon (as it reveals itself) can begin to manifest. The 
extension of the soul, however, will undergo a semi-destruction of its own—for, despite 
its innovation, it remains absorbed in everydayness. It is a pre-constructive element in 
this, albeit slightly modified, hermeneutical method. Hence, Augustine‘s extension of the 
soul initiates the unconcealment of the time phenomenon and can be utilized as an 
appropriate prologue to the construction. 
  
36 
 
Chapter 2: Ecstatic Horizon (the Destruction) 
Before Augustine‘s extension of the soul is discussed, the destruction of what has been 
laid out thus far will ensue. It seems fitting to begin this destructive examination with the 
presupposition of God being outside time and thus not affected by alteration and change. 
Not only is this presupposition made early in Book XI, but it appears to be a common 
strategy that others have adopted throughout the history of philosophy. The problem of 
ontotheology—a practice that is also not unique to Augustine—will be scrutinized. Thus, 
these two elements, the presupposition and the ontotheological discourse, will be shown 
to bring about ―now-time,‖ which is the continued privileging of the now over the past 
and future.
133
 Such privileging of the now is what causes Augustine‘s notion of time to 
remain in the everyday.  
According to Augustine, God lives in an ―eternal present,‖ which situates God 
outside space and time, i.e., God ―is immobile eternity.‖134 Boethius will come to the 
same conclusion in his Consolation of Philosophy in which he is then able to account for 
free will within God‘s foreknowledge.135 Even Kant resorted to presupposing noumena 
where our presupposed God/freedom exist and phenomena where the realm of 
appearances exist.
136
 Kant created this split in order to solve the problem of freedom 
within necessity and to account for the immortality of the soul, which has profound 
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implications for his ethics.
137
 These problems—God‘s foreknowledge, freedom and even 
the possibility of human morality—have been explained away with presuppositions. The 
objects under investigation (God, freedom, etc.), are presupposed to be outside our 
spatiotemporal existence. It is thought that our experiences cannot adequately explain 
these objects and thus any experiences we have of them (if any) are starkly different from 
how they are ‗in themselves.‘ Therefore, rather than actually investigating our 
experiences of the phenomena, philosophers have continued to rely solely on 
presuppositions.  
2.1: The Destruction of everyday time leading to Saint Augustine’s Extension of the Soul  
(Distentio Anime) 
 
With our initial position in mind, we have to construe what is going on in these 
presuppositions. For the most part, it seems as though Augustine (and Boethius and Kant) 
are actually looking away from the objects that they are supposed to be investigating. 
Augustine is not allowing the object, viz. time, to speak to him. By presupposing that 
God is outside of time, both God and the time phenomenon are simply being ignored. In 
this explanation, time becomes relegated to a description of what God is not and, in turn, 
a negative description of God follows—God becomes known only by those attributes 
which God is not.
138
 Nothing positive can be determined about God in such explanations 
and, furthermore, the time phenomenon gets explained away. So why are their objects 
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under investigation (God and freedom) being presupposed to be outside time and what 
does that then mean for the time phenomenon?  
One possible answer is that in order to provide an account of ‗the beginning‘ or 
the creation of the world, one has traditionally supposed a creator (unmoved mover, God 
etc.). This creator is therefore responsible for creating all that exists, which must 
necessarily include time. As stated above, it seems as though the concept of time is being 
conjoined with creation. Time was created and that which is responsible for creating time 
(God) is not bound by time, thus the possibility of distinguishing the creator from the 
created is opened up. If the creator is outside (and not bound by) time and likewise 
responsible for creating time, then an explanation of the genesis of time has also been 
provided. Hence, time can be investigated in order to distinguish finite beings from God 
and equally God can be investigated in order to explain the origins of time. The creator 
and time appear to be mutually reliant on one another for the possibility of providing 
explanations. Such explanations have concealed the phenomenon of time by not 
investigating it as it actually appear to us.  
The problem of time must be grasped in the way we originally experience 
temporality in factical life experience—entirely irrespective of all pure 
consciousness and of all pure time.
139
 
 
Augustine has assumed a creation of the object under investigation that is not actually 
accessible to us—we cannot factically experience the creation of time. Augustine‘s causal 
explanation demonstrating God‘s act of creating time (and heaven and earth) has merely 
covered up and even distorted the time phenomenon.  
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These presuppositions (God being outside of time and thus the creator of time) are 
what Heidegger would call ontotheology.
140
 Basically, philosophers have been trying to 
explain many things, in particular the concept of time, by relying on notions such as the 
―unmoved mover,‖ the ―constant‖ and the ―eternal.‖141 The problem, as mentioned above, 
is that the phenomenon of time does not reveal itself to us in a manner that permits us to 
adequately discuss its creation and generation. In other words, we cannot experience time 
prior to its/our existence and thus philosophers cannot investigate it in such a manner 
without relying on (grandiose) assumptions. They have, therefore, resolved to investigate 
time as an object detached from factical life experience—adopting an ―attitude‖ that 
directs and focuses ―away from[themselves] toward the matter.‖142 By ignoring the 
―relational meaning,‖ the phenomenon of time has been continually covered up and the 
everyday interpretations have prevailed. This is the problem of ontotheology, which 
Heidegger associates with the Scholastics (and the entire history of metaphysics), 
claiming that ontotheology is responsible for the perpetual forgetfulness of being.
143
 
Ontotheology has not only ―exempted‖ us from investigating the question of the meaning 
of being, but, as stated above, has actually hidden many truths, especially the truth about 
primordial temporality.
144
 By discussing the creation of time in this manner (i.e., with the 
presupposition of the Biblical interpretation of genesis and thus detached from factical 
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life), it seems that Augustine has adopted yet another everyday retelling of the story of 
time. 
If fundamental definitions of human being which are dogmatically theological are 
to be excluded in radical philosophical reflections on being . . ., then we must 
refrain from an explicit and especially a hidden, inexplicit orientation to already 
defined ideas of human being.
145
  
 
Although the above quote is in relation to an inquiry into human being, the same can be 
said of an inquiry into time, for the two are interconnected.
146
 By following and 
recapitulating the Biblical tradition (or any other tradition for that matter), it can be 
argued that Augustine simply elevates his own ―world-view‖ and does not go back to 
―scientific philosophy‖ in which lies the ―proper and sole theme of philosophy.‖147 
According to Heidegger, philosophy as world-view is merely related to the ―particular 
contemporary Dasein at any given time,‖ whereas scientific philosophy is ―philosophy as 
science of being.‖148 It is a distinction between ontic (world-view) and ontological 
(science of being), which is why the phenomenon of time is being covered up by 
Augustine‘s everyday interpretation of it. 
Perhaps this is what Heidegger means when he classifies Augustine‘s view of 
time as not being rigorous in comparison to Aristotle‘s. Interestingly, this can also be 
regarded as one of the possible explanations for why Heidegger felt the need to keep 
philosophy and theology separate—finding that by keeping a ―world-view‖ one is 
perpetually prevented from (rigorously) investigating the question of the meaning of 
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being. This does not in any way suggest that those who have religious beliefs are being 
lead astray. On the contrary, it simply points out that any strongly held belief (not only 
religious beliefs, but essentially any pre-philosophical commitment that one may have), 
might constrain one‘s inquiries. The philosopher may find it difficult to go back to a time 
when such beliefs and commitments were not present, which prevents the object under 
investigation from revealing itself. The ―crisis of the sciences,‖ which Heidegger notes, is 
due to the uncertainty of the ―basic relationship‖ of the sciences to their individual 
―subject matters.‖149 Relying on methodologies that are developed out of a 
―propaedeutic‖ analysis results in similar presuppositions and assumptions discussed 
above.
150
 For the object cannot reveal itself if there is already an answer provided.
151
 In 
fact, returning to Augustine, his position is so strongly fixed that one can actually feel the 
constraints on his philosophical contemplations—he presupposes many things as a result 
of his religious convictions: 
To whom shall I cry? ‗The day is yours and the night is yours‘ (Ps. 73:16). At 
your nod the moments fly by. From them grant us space for our meditations on 
the secret recesses of your law, and do not close the gate to us was we knock.
152
 
 
Augustine admittedly believes that there are things that we do not know and that all we 
can know is what God allows for us to know. It can be argued that the adoption of such a 
starting point causes him to acknowledge a serious constraint on his ability to know and 
inquire. This obviously comes from the belief in Divine knowledge vs. human 
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knowledge, which has been disseminated by notions of perfection vs. imperfection.
153
 
Augustine clearly recognizes the limits of human knowledge in comparison to Divine 
knowledge, which restricts his inquiry.  
That is not to suggest that we ignore the possible constraints; on the contrary, we 
have to be fully aware of them and embrace them. For example, the genesis of time is not 
something that we can investigate, i.e., I am aware of my constraints when investigating 
the time phenomenon. In addition, Heidegger acknowledges ―how constraining the 
vocabulary of conscience is‖ when trying to capture the phenomenon under 
investigation.
154
 Not having the adequate vocabulary can prevent one from being able to 
simply pose the correct question, viz., the question of the meaning of being. This is why 
Heidegger uses phrases like ‗being-towards-death‘ and ‗ready-to-hand‘ in order to 
describe existentiell/existential states of being.  In order to be able to express such states, 
one requires the corresponding vocabulary. If no such vocabulary exists, then one must 
create the vocabulary (as Heidegger has done). The constraints, as stated previously, are 
made clear by my initial position—the fact that I cannot factically experience time before 
it existed and have trouble even discussing the question of being with our limited 
vocabulary. Thus all inquiries into such notions of the genesis of time (aside from the 
genesis of time throughout history) are impossible given my initial position. Likewise, in 
order to investigate the question of being adequately, certain terms need to be put forth 
for the sake of factically capturing existence. In order to avoid getting lost in 
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everydayness, I must be aware of my constraints when investigating the phenomenon of 
time.  
Augustine, however, seems to be wholly unaware of his initial position, direction 
and scope of looking (the ―how‖ of being-interpreted).155 In this case, Augustine can be 
said to be following a tradition that has been handed down to him (the everyday way of 
interpreting time) and not how the phenomenon of time is actually revealing itself. This is 
not unique to Augustine; in fact, the way the time phenomenon has been treated 
throughout the history of philosophy has been confined to the everyday interpretation. 
Hence the object under investigation is being concealed by this traditional way of 
examining it, i.e., the concept of time falls into ―the public way of having been 
interpreted.‖156 For Heidegger, traditional metaphysics is ―the tendency to falling in 
prephilosophical life‖ and Augustine‘s way of examining time is yet another example of 
such a tendency.
157
 By concealing the object under investigation (time), a concealment of 
life ensues, i.e., ―life is concealed, alienated‖ from itself.158 Alienating life from oneself 
further constrains one‘s ability to investigate life. Additionally, Augustine is not only 
constrained by the alienation that he has conjured for himself (by adopting the traditional 
everyday interpretation), but he also assumes yet another constraint: that his knowledge is 
limited to what God allows for. He is in fact putting an additional constraint on himself. 
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By adopting such an assumption (that he can only know what God deems appropriate), he 
essentially constrains himself further—for the assumption of a constraint is, in fact, a 
constraint. Thus, by not acknowledging his own position of looking and by assuming a 
superfluous constraint, he is alienating himself further away from the object under 
investigation. It can be argued, in addition, that Augustine‘s assumed constraint actually 
contributes to the concealing of his own initial position of looking—for he cannot even 
pose the correct questions as a result. Such questions can never arise if one assumes that 
the answer cannot be known due to certain limitations (that God has) put on the human 
mind. It could be argued, of course, that Augustine is aware of his initial position by the 
sheer fact that he is working within the dominant religious structure of his time (applying 
his temporally conditioned present situation, which is predominately Christian, on to his 
analysis). However, he does not acknowledge this, he simply takes his position for 
granted and it thus becomes more akin to dogma than the ―how‖ of bring-interpreted.159 
Thus, many presuppositions appear in Augustine‘s thought that can be seen to be limiting 
his inquiry and, as a result, the possibilities that can be opened up.  
Setting aside the ontotheological problem, the next problem of this (everyday) 
conception of time is that it continues to privilege the ‗now.‘ By continually asserting that 
the present exists (but the past and future do not), philosophers such as Zeno have found 
themselves lost and falling into paradoxes: 
The ―nows‖ are what get counted. And these show themselves ‗in every ―now‖‘ 
as ―nows‖ which will ‗forthwith be no-longer now‘ and ―nows‖ which have ‗just 
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been now-not-yet.‘ The world-time which is ‗sighted‘ in this manner in the use of 
clocks, we call the ―now-time.‖160 
 
Heidegger arrives at this conclusion by discussing how we deal with time in average 
everydayness, i.e., we count and measure changes by following the ―travelling pointer‖ 
on a clock or a sundial or by simply following the sun itself.
161
 Discussing the movement 
of the sun is a common method used to investigate time,
162
 which points to something 
very significant about the way we interpret our experiences of time. For the most part, 
time is being dealt with in a chronological manner—as a sequence of events, a ―flowing 
stream of nows.‖‖163 Augustine‘s everyday way of interpreting time is yet another 
example of philosophers continuing to believe that time is chronology. Chronological 
observations of time appear to have dominated philosophy in which events occur in an 
orderly fashion; event a followed by event b followed by event c etc. The word 
chronology and its meaning can be traced back to the Greek god Chronos: 
Yet the gods who always existed are probably conceived as original forms (by 
etymology) of conventional figures from the traditional theogony; and one of 
them is ‗Time‘ [Chronos], which might naturally be felt, without any deep 
reflexion, to have been unborn.
164
 
 
The god Chronos is also thought to be responsible for the initial creation of the other 
deities, which were created out of his seed.
165
 In other words, Chronos is responsible for 
an ordered sequence of events occurring, which is a common element of most creation 
myths. There appears to be a frequent theme here, which goes back to the previous 
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discussion: that time is the condition for the possibility of other created beings coming 
into existence. This focus on the origins of time and its contribution to cosmogony is one 
that has clearly pervaded philosophical inquiries into time. For Heidegger, this is a result 
of the adoption of ―Greek ontotheological thinking‖ that infiltrated Christian theology—
something that is clearly observable in Augustine.
166
  The problem of such a fixation on 
cosmogony (that seems to disseminate the notion of chronology), is that the more 
qualitative way of defining time, namely time as ―Kairos,‖ has been forgotten.167 As 
opposed to chronological time, which is sequential, kairos ―is the temporal dimension of 
decision,‖ i.e., it is an attitude or a way of being-towards time.168 
Augustine is an interesting case—for he denies the existence of the past and the 
future, but appears to have provided an explanation for why both ‗times‘ seem to impact 
our daily lives. Augustine is interested in exploring why we appear to have a conception 
of the past and the future despite them having no actual existence. He attributes this 
conception to an ―extension‖—one that occurs in the mind where, in the present, events 
are ―remembered‖ and ―expected.‖ Although Augustine still maintains that they do not 
exist, he is including an account of our way of dealing with time which is more 
kairological than chronological, i.e., how we factically experience time as opposed to 
simply counting it.
169
 This is probably what Heidegger means when he states that 
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Augustine appears to be an exception to the tradition, but nevertheless remains 
Aristotelian ―in principle.‖ On the other hand, he is moving in the right direction by 
proposing the ―extension‖ that is remarkably similar to Heidegger‘s ―ecstatic 
temporality,‖ which will be discussed in section 2.2.  
Now that the common, everyday interpretation of time has gone through a 
reduction and destruction, it is time to lay the foundations that will initiate the 
construction. In the destruction, problems with the everyday interpretation of time were 
revealed: the initial position of looking was overshadowed by presuppositions, which are 
a result of ontotheology (cosmogony) leading to the conclusion of chronological or 
―now‖ time. Cosmogony can include the investigation of the act of creation by God or 
simply how everything came into existence sans God, i.e., a scientific account of the 
genesis of all that exists. Either attempt—God or science—causes the phenomena under 
investigation (being and time) to be conceived as constant presence-at-hand.  By failing 
to notice the initial position and the deeply ingrained pre-philosophical commitments, the 
inquiries into time have become lost in everydayness. Time was not being explored as it 
reveals itself, but rather was being dealt with in an everyday manner; by counting it, 
measuring it and, of course, by curiously investigating its origins.
170
 It is not so much that 
this way of dealing with time is completely inaccurate, in fact (just like our everyday way 
of living) it is how we deal with time for the most part. We are absorbed in everydayness 
and, as a result, our experiences of time are absorbed in everydayness as well, hence we 
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cannot help but count and calculate time in our daily lives. It then follows that our 
inquiries into time (even the most rigorous) have become levelled down. By continually 
neglecting the initial position, direction and scope of looking at an object under 
investigation—the ―how‖ of being interpreted—the time phenomenon has continued to 
evade philosophers. Chronological time, the time that philosophers have been hitherto 
preoccupied with, is not wrong, but it is not the entire story. Out of the destruction comes 
a construction. By revealing these everyday accounts it is now possible to uncover 
something new about the time phenomenon, something that can be found in Augustine‘s 
same treaty on time. Augustine‘s notion of the extension of the soul—the pre-
constructive phase—will now ensue. 
Augustine‘s explanation of time has been reduced and destroyed; however, he 
possesses another account that must be revealed. This account deals with how we 
experience time, i.e., what is actually happening to us when we experience time as 
opposed to time (in itself) that is beyond our experiences. Augustine is very clear that this 
experience of time is solely related to human beings and their experiences and is not how 
God sees it: 
Nevertheless, Lord, we are conscious of intervals of time, we compare them with 
each other, and call some longer, others shorter. We also measure how much 
longer or shorter one period is than another.
171
 
 
Humans perceive time not only as it occurs in those instantaneous moments, but rather as 
time which is over and time which will be, but how is this possible? Augustine still 
wishes to maintain that the past and future do not exist, yet we seem to be aware of them 
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(despite their lack of existence). Past and future are produced in the present, by us, not as 
actual events but as ―words conceived from images of them.‖172 Images are produced in 
the ―memory‖ from events past while the future is the ―images of realities‖ that are yet to 
exist, i.e., we are accustomed to thinking of what is going to occur in the future, a 
―premeditation‖ of our actions, events, etc.173 Our memories and premeditations occur in 
our present and thus the existence of past and future resides in these forms in our present. 
For Augustine, the soul has ―these three aspects of time:‖ 
. . . a present of things past, a present of things present, a present of things to 
come. . . . the present considering the past is memory, the present considering the 
present is immediate awareness, the present considering the future is 
expectation.
174
 
 
We therefore conclude that there are three times: past, present, and future. Augustine 
takes note of the fact that speaking in such a way is ―incorrect‖—it is the ―common 
usage‖ that is applied in our ―common place everyday‖ discourse.175 Although it is 
incorrect, much like ―most of our language,‖ the idea nevertheless gets ―communicated‖ 
and is representative of our way of experiencing time.
176
 Time, therefore, must be an 
―extension‖—something that is measured—but it is not a measurement of time itself.177 
Augustine concludes that such an endeavour, to measure time itself, is not something that 
has been reached. It can be argued that, at least in this case, Augustine is in fact 
acknowledging a legitimate constraint with respect to our ability to experience time. 
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Augustine therefore concludes that (given the evidence thus explored) ―time is simply a 
distension.‖178 This distension occurs in the mind where the impressions of things stay 
with us when they have passed away and cease to be. This is why it is the mind that 
―expects and attends and remembers‖—what is expected gets passed into attention which 
gets passed into what is remembered:
179
 
A person singing or listening to a song he knows well suffers a distension or 
stretching in feeling and in sense-perception from the expectation of future sounds 
and the memory of past sound.
180
 
 
This is what time is for human beings, but for God, which was discussed previously, no 
such sequential or successive time exists. 
 The significance of Augustine‘s extension of the soul is something that went 
unrecognized by many philosophers, including Augustine, until recently—for it was only 
in later times that its significance was discerned.
181
 For the most part, the everyday 
interpretation of time persisted and thereby concealed certain essential features. Although 
the extension of the soul was not entirely ignored, it was not until later that its 
implications would be exposed—especially with the rise of phenomenology:  
And, Augustine will show us, and contemporary phenomenological philosophers 
will tend to agree with him, that this field of presence is not the presence of God, 
but rather, it is the presence of ourselves in the existential unfolding of our own 
experiences.
182
 
 
The tendency to construe Augustine‘s thought as phenomenological will now be 
unconcealed once again. Husserl marveled at Augustine‘s account of the extension of the 
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soul.
183
 Before Augustine, time was viewed, for the most part, as being outside the mind 
as ―cosmic time,‖ i.e., a time which is independent of human beings and their 
experiences.
184
 Aristotle adopted such a view of time, which, as Heidegger points out, set 
the foundations for the everyday notion of time that pervaded philosophy for so long. 
Augustine does have some notion of cosmic time, which was destructed above. Hence 
Augustine never broke away entirely from the everyday conception and continued to 
remain Aristotelian (in principle). On the other hand, Augustine observes the time 
phenomenon in a way that is much more phenomenologically sophisticated than any of 
his predecessors. The notion of a ―field of presence,‖ attributed to Merleau-Ponty, 
maintains that time is this field of presence or horizon.
185
  
By interpreting Augustine in this way, i.e., by interpreting him in light of an 
―existential unfolding of our own experiences,‖ something extraordinary reveals itself to 
us. Not only can it be said that later phenomenologists were clearly influenced by 
Augustine, but it demonstrates exactly what Augustine is ‗doing.‘ As was mentioned 
earlier, Augustine is ‗doing‘ phenomenology, albeit, unbeknownst to himself. His 
explanation of the extension of the soul—as a way to comprehend time—is clearly (what 
we in our temporally conditioned situation would call) phenomenological. Augustine is 
accounting for human experiences of time and not simply time that objectively 
encompasses the entire cosmos. Accordingly, Book XI of the Confessions can be divided 
into two sections: (1) the creation of time by God who is located outside of time; (2) 
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human beings‘ factical life experience of time. This division is not something that 
Augustine himself necessarily intended; however, in this analysis, such a division has 
been clearly delineated. Creating such a division is only possible provided that we look 
back at these texts from a present, which allows for such interpretations to arise. Thus, in 
this thesis, chapter 1 (in particular section 1.2.) fell into everydayness and guided a 
misconstrual and concealing of the time phenomenon. Chapter 2, following the 
destruction, has thus far outlined Augustine‘s extension of the soul. For it is in the section 
on the extension of the soul that the construction of the time phenomenon (as it reveals 
itself to us) is attempted. As mentioned above, it is a distinction between cosmic time and 
phenomenological time—both of which are found in the same treatment of time put forth 
by Augustine.
186
 
Augustine‘s great discovery is that an adequate treatment of the reality of time 
requires an account which will address the fact that the time is experienced 
perspectivally.
187
 
 
This is why it is appropriate to reconstruct Heidegger‘s hermeneutical method with 
Augustine—for such an analysis can account for the everyday interpretation of time and 
introduce time as it is factically experienced. With our initial position—facticity—in 
mind, we can view Augustine‘s account of the extension of the soul as an example of 
how one deals with factical life experience in relation to time. We find within this 
account elements of human factical life experiences that Heidegger himself discussed. 
The phenomena of memory and expectation (ways of accounting for the past and the 
future within the present) are two human experiences that Heidegger will deal with in 
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Being and Time. This analysis does not intend to provide a comparison of Augustine and 
Heidegger, but rather to consider both in order to attain a better understanding of the 
phenomenology of time vis-à-vis factical life experience.  
2.2: Heidegger’s Ecstasis - Inauthenticity 
Like Augustine, Heidegger wishes to explain how time is actually experienced by human 
beings. For Heidegger, Everyday Dasein finds itself ―thrown‖ into a particular ―there;‖ 
this throwing of Dasein into a ―there‖ can only occur provided that there was something 
that came before the ―there.‖188 In other words, Dasein finds itself in a particular ―state-
of-mind‖ that resulted from the past—state-of-mind ―temporalizes itself primarily as 
―having-been.‖‖189 We find ourselves in a particular state-of-mind, but that state-of-mind 
is not something that arose out of nowhere; on the contrary, it is grounded in and arises 
from our past. Hence, Dasein‘s ―being-thrown‖ is simply Dasein finding itself in a state-
of-mind.
190
 The experience of a mood is the ―equiprimordial disclosure‖ of the ―there,‖ 
i.e., one finds oneself in a mood, which ontologically manifests itself as ―how one 
is.‖191Again, the mood that one finds oneself in is derived from events that have passed 
and that now, in the present, determine ―how one is.‖ Therefore, Dasein always finds 
itself in a mood: ―Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has been 
delivered over in its being.‖192 Effectively, ―Dasein is its ―there‖‖ and finds itself in a 
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state-of-mind in which a mood is always disclosed.
193
 In having a mood, one either ―turns 
towards the burdensome character of Dasein‖ or away from it—for the most part Dasein, 
in an everyday manner, turns away and experiences moods such as ―elation.‖194  
What all this means for Heidegger is that the past events are what determine the 
―there‖ in which Dasein finds itself, i.e., the past enables and determines the present.195 
The way that Dasein engages in the present, however, is by occupying itself with tasks in 
order to accomplish certain goals. As was discussed in connection with everydayness, 
Dasein is absorbed in the world of its concern and the projects that Dasein undertakes are 
for the sake of realizing goals. These goals, however, are not to be understood 
teleologically, but rather as that which Dasein moves towards, e.g., I cut down a tree ―in-
order-to‖ chop it into pieces ―in-order-to‖ build a shed and so on.196 State-of-mind 
temporalizes itself as having-been (as something that resulted from the past), however, 
state-of-mind also has its understanding.
197
 By engaging in projects ―understandingly‖ in 
this manner, Dasein is ontically ―able to manage something,‖ i.e., has an understanding of 
how to complete certain tasks.
198
 Ontically, one knows what one needs to do in order to 
complete a specific task and to attain a certain outcome. This knowledge is knowledge of 
what one wants the future to be, i.e., what the wood will be (in the future) is a shed. 
Dasein moves towards that which does not yet exist for the sake of bringing that which 
does not exist into existence. Ontologically, Dasein is therefore revealed as ―possibility,‖ 
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Dasein is always ―what it can be,‖ it is ―being-possible.‖199 Hence, this ―in-order-to‖ in 
which Dasein undertakes projects is called, quite rightly, ―projecting:‖ 
Projection is basically futural; it does not primarily grasp the projected possibility 
thematically just by having it in view, but it throws itself into it as a possibility. In 
each case Dasein is understandingly in the way that it can be.
200
 
 
Tasks are completed ―for-the-sake-of‖ some outcome, which is futural.201 Dasein is a 
―thrown-projection‖—thrown from the past and projecting into the future by engaging in 
projects.
202
 This can be easily exemplified in an ontic way, an example of which was 
demonstrated with the building of a shed above; however, it is an ontological 
determination. This is what Heidegger calls the ―ecstatical character of primordial 
temporality.‖203 Ecstasis means being outside of oneself. In an ontic way it can be 
described as daydreaming or even planning ahead. It is operative anytime that one drifts 
off into the past or the future, but this ecstasis always comes back to the present in which 
the present is then affected by the drifting. Past knowledge thrusts Dasein into tasks that 
Dasein undertakes with a future outcome expected and, with that past knowledge and 
future expectation, Dasein can act in the present accordingly (e.g. building a shed). In 
other words, the ecstatic horizon of past, present and future are connected such that, as 
was demonstrated above, one‘s ―having-been‖ and ―to-come‖ affects one‘s ―now.‖204  
Moods temporalize themselves—that is, their specific ecstasis belongs to a future 
and a present in such a way, indeed, that these equiprimordial ecstases are 
modified by having been.
205
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This modification is not unidirectional, but rather circular—for it is not simply the 
―having been‖ that modifies the present and the future, but also the future that modifies 
the present. Moreover, the present and the future modify the ―having been‖ (just as with 
the hermeneutical situation where a present inquiry modifies the ―having been‖ of 
previous ideas, revealing something new in those ideas). This ecstatic horizon sounds 
similar to Augustine‘s notion of extension, in which one ―remembers,‖ ―attends‖ and 
―expects.‖ Both Heidegger and Augustine use these modes to describe the same 
phenomenon: factical life experience in relation to time. Augustine‘s explanation of 
extension clearly had an effect on Heidegger—for he quotes Augustine‘s explanation of 
extension in Being and Time.
206
 Although they are both dealing with the same factical life 
experience, there are some significant differences between their interpretations of those 
experiences that should be observed.  
It is important to note that for Heidegger there is an ―authentic‖ and ―inauthentic‖ 
way of experiencing the ecstases. When Dasein is absorbed in everydayness it ―is its 
there in an everyday manner.‖207 For example, ―awaiting‖ is an inauthentic mode of the 
future, ―forgetting‖ reveals an inauthentic past, and ―curiosity‖ or ―falling‖ reveals an 
inauthentic ―making-present.‖208 Awaiting is akin to expecting, where one expects 
something with which one is concerned, i.e., expecting to build a shed. Awaiting and 
expecting are awaiting and expecting certain things in the future, ―a concernful expecting 
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of‖ something or other.209 Being preoccupied with the future in a way where the objects 
of its concern are encountered in the world, causes Dasein to ―forget‖ its ―ownmost 
being.‖210 Dasein‘s inauthentic relation to its future influences its relation to its ―having 
been‖ (its past), such that it forgets. Dasein is absorbed in everydayness, which is caused 
by fleeing in the face of Dasein‘s ultimate future. This brings us back to the notion of 
impending death: what is ―threatening come[s] back to one‘s factically concernful 
potentiality-for-being.‖211 In other words, as pointed out in the section on everydayness, 
by ignoring one‘s potentiality-for-being (death), Dasein flees from and forgets itself. 
Thus the future directly affects the past—by having an inauthentic relation to the future 
(avoiding one‘s ownmost being), Dasein becomes preoccupied and forgets its having-
been. Consequently, by inauthentically relating to one‘s future and past, one 
inauthentically dwells in the present. Curiosity is a ―making-present‖ that ―leaps 
away.‖212 Dasein constantly seeks something out of curiosity and once Dasein has caught 
―sight‖ of that something, it leaps to the next thing which is available.213 This may 
explain the tendency to connect time to cosmogony. As stated previously, philosophers 
seek answers to the phenomenon of time by entwining it with stories of creation. 
Therefore, by curiously exploring time in connection with cosmogony, philosophers have 
been concealing as opposed to revealing the objects that they are investigating. For 
Heidegger, this is the ―existential-temporal condition for the possibility of 
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―distraction.‖‖214 The notion of falling into everydayness, which is also connected to 
curiosity, is the other way of explaining such a phenomenon: Dasein falls into average 
everydayness in which the ―they-self‖ takes over one‘s burden of being.215 Dasein flees in 
the face of its ownmost being and turns to ―the they,‖ the everyday and common way of 
understanding: 
The category of ruination expresses the fact that the kinesis of inauthentic life is 
not only a ―toward itself,‖ but simultaneously the ―against itself,‖ ―away from 
itself,‖ and ―out of itself‖ of falling-away, which Heidegger now called the plunge 
or crash (das Sturz) out of authentic time and into the domain of the They.
216
 
  
These are the ways of public interpretation—the future becomes nothing more than an 
extension of the present.
217
 It is a ―collapse into the presence of the today,‖ which can be 
seen in Augustine‘s extension of the soul that privileges the present and thereby 
relegating the future and past to mere extensions that occur in the mind.
218
 These three 
inauthentic states, which have been outlined only in brief, refer back to the everyday 
being of Dasein. 
Although Augustine appeared to deal with the time phenomenon more 
originally—dealing with time as it reveals itself—he did not go far enough. From the 
Heideggerian perspective, Augustine‘s extension of the soul remains absorbed in the 
everyday way of experiencing time; it is an example of the inauthentic ecstases. 
Augustine‘s notion of expectation signals back to the preoccupation that we have with 
things in the world, which is not an authentic attitude to have towards the future. 
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Augustine discusses the phenomenon of memory; however, if the future is construed 
inauthentically, then the past and present will necessarily be construed inauthentically as 
well. This is why Augustine‘s notion of time was used as the everyday example and, 
additionally, as a pre-constructive element in this analysis. Augustine did not go far 
enough—he did not deal with time authentically—and this is why he is not being used as 
an example in the full construction. Augustine is nevertheless an important contributor to 
the development of the phenomenology of time and is clearly vital when it comes to 
discussing how the time phenomenon reveals itself to us in everydayness. However, just 
like Aristotle who only proposed an initial approach, there must be something more 
primordial than what Augustine has offered, viz., something that ―temporalizes itself 
authentically.‖219  
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Chapter 3: Temporality (the Construction) 
Augustine‘s notion of the extension of the soul was able to account for the time 
phenomenon as it reveals itself to us. This account is phenomenological and its 
implications—the factical human experience of time—was unprecedented for its time and 
not even acknowledged until centuries later. Obviously this acknowledgement only 
comes about following a hermeneutical analysis of Augustine‘s work, something that he 
did not necessarily anticipate. Augustine‘s treatment of time was not intentionally 
constructed to be classified and separated into two different accounts—cosmic vs. 
phenomenological. This is something that we (living in a temporally particular present) 
are able to acknowledge, now. As has been stated earlier, Heidegger believes that the past 
is only past when seen from a present, hence we must include our present in our analysis 
of the past. In other words, we have to be aware of our initial position, direction and 
scope of looking at an object of inquiry, in this case, Augustine‘s notion of time. Facticity 
was our initial position in looking at Augustine‘s notion of time and what we sought 
throughout this analysis, which was clearly exemplified.  
Despite Augustine‘s immense contribution to the phenomenology of time, he 
nevertheless discussed the time phenomenon as it is revealed inauthentically. Augustine 
appears to have become absorbed with Greek metaphysics, which concealed that which 
he was seeking.
220
 He did not possess an authentic attitude towards the ecstases and 
thereby continued to cover up notions of kairological time and primordial temporality. In 
order to unconceal these notions, we have to make clear the authentic ecstases. The 
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following section will begin with an elucidation of authenticity, which will lead us to the 
appropriate attitude toward time that can be adopted; this attitude will be exemplified in 
primal Christianity. 
3.1: Authenticity 
The authentic modes of the ecstatic horizon result when we comport ourselves in a 
particular manner toward our past, present and future. As was discussed previously, the 
ways in which we encounter our past drastically affect how we perceive and experience 
our present and future. Once more, this is not unidirectional, so how we encounter one 
time component (past, present or future) will determine how we experience the other two. 
If we momentarily suspend our preoccupation with our worldly concerns, viz., if we un-
absorb ourselves with the world, then we open up the possibility of encountering our 
ownmost being. This encounter amounts to an attitude that we adopt toward the past, 
present and future resulting in an authentic experience of time. Anticipation is the 
authentic future, retaining is the authentic past and moment of vision is the authentic 
present. The following section will be a repetition of the previous discussion that took 
place regarding Dasein‘s inauthentic being; however, it will be with regard to Dasein‘s 
authentic being in which the ecstases are experienced. 
Anticipation is unlike awaiting and expecting—for it is anticipation of something 
that is not a worldly concern. As has been stated numerous times, Dasein exists unto its 
no-longer-being-in-the-world, which is the ―possibility of the absolute impossibility of 
62 
 
Dasein‖—death.221 Dasein is a thrown-projection—thrown into the world and projecting 
into the impending future, which is no-longer-in-the-world. Hence, Dasein is always its 
―having been;‖ however, in this case, not as state-of-mind/mood, but rather, as the nullity 
of being. This was emphasized previously by the ways in which the past, present and 
future relate to one another. Dasein cannot be anything but what it always already was, 
i.e., Dasein was not-in-the-world (not born), but emerged into-the-world (born) and will 
eventually no-longer-be-in-the-world yet again.
222
 By ecstatically anticipating the nullity 
of being, as opposed to expecting and being distracted by random objects of our concern 
(shed building), Dasein can be ―resolute.‖223 It is only when Dasein willingly accepts 
this—where it came from and where it is going—that it can come back from this 
impending potentiality to the present. Dasein must choose itself by coming face-to-face 
with its ownmost being, i.e., Dasein has to achieve a ―drawing back from the Everyone by 
way of self-choosing.‖224 
Dasein is not itself the basis of its being, inasmuch as this basis first arises from 
its own projection; rather, as being-its-self, it is the being of its basis. This basis is 
never anything but the basis for an entity whose being has to take over being-a-
basis.
225
 
 
Essentially, one has to take hold of one‘s existence ―in its entirety‖ and in spite of its 
―unfinished character,‖ i.e., to accept what one is and what one is not, which is the same 
thing (a nullity).
226
 The fact that we are existing now does not cancel out the fact that we 
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were not existing before and will no longer exist at some point (at any point) in time. This 
is why we are not the basis of our own being—for ―our existence is never our own.‖227 
The inauthentic way of standing before death revealed that death is no longer dealt with; 
it is cast aside, ignored, while we preoccupy ourselves with worldly possibilities. 
Likewise with the inauthentic ―making-present‖ and the inauthentic ―forgetting‖ of one‘s 
―having been‖ there is something more primordial, that of the ―moment of vision‖ and 
―retaining.‖ 228 In anticipatory resoluteness Dasein comes back from its potentiality-for-
being (no-longer-in-the-world) to the ―moment of vision‖ in which Dasein ―retains‖ (or 
―remembers‖) its ―having been.‖ In this anticipatory resoluteness, one has taken hold of 
its ownmost being and, as a result, all three time components are modified to reflect that. 
This is the exact same modification that was described in connection with the inauthentic 
ecstases (on page 38). It is therefore important to note that the relation between the three 
time components—past, present and future—operate in the same manner, i.e., the same 
modification occurs whether they are experienced authentically or inauthentically. The 
authentic way of experiencing the past, present and future will be expounded upon further 
as the construction of the time phenomenon is carried out. For now, however, a brief 
reiteration concerning what has been achieved thus far and where this analysis still 
intends to go as a result shall ensue.  
Augustine was treated as the exemplar of the everyday notion of time in which 
Aristotle‘s influence was clearly observed. Although the direction that Augustine took to 
explain time is quite different from that of Aristotle—Augustine adopted the Christian 
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perspective—similar presuppositions and tendencies nevertheless revealed themselves to 
us. Such tendencies include the connection between time and movement, the privileging 
of the ‗now,‘ and even (it can be argued) the genesis of time. Aristotle may not have 
provided a description of the creation of time as such; however, he did describe the 
unmoved mover in which he was able to account for the creation of motion and (by 
extension) the possibility of time. Aristotle‘s influence is easily detectable within 
Augustine‘s notion of time driving the everyday conception that has permeated 
philosophical inquiry. In the destruction it was revealed that, like Aristotle, Augustine has 
propagated the everyday notion of time, which covers up the time phenomenon in the 
process. In destroying Augustine‘s notion of time it became apparent that Augustine was 
in fact able to go further and address the time phenomenon as it reveals itself to us. This 
is one of the primary reasons that Augustine was selected in this analysis—for he not 
only perpetuates the everyday notion of time, but he (at the same time) moves closer to 
the time phenomenon as we factically experience it. The extension of the soul, 
hermeneutically assessed, is clearly a phenomenological account of how we factically 
experience time, albeit in an everyday manner. It is this everyday manner in which time 
has been continually dealt with that leads Heidegger to distinguish between authentic and 
inauthentic ecstases bringing us closer to the construction of the time phenomenon.  
This construction, however, is one that can be uncovered in a previous idea, an 
idea that Heidegger appropriately goes back to: Paul and the notion of 
kairological/eschatological time. This section shall deal with Paul‘s Letters, both as 
Heidegger himself engaged with them and how others have construed Heidegger‘s 
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affiliation with them (for much can be observed about what Heidegger says and yet does 
not say about Christianity in relation to his own thought). A brief section discussing the 
influence that Judaism had on primal Christianity will first be provided, which will shed 
more light on how the time phenomenon was later developed by Christians (and arguably 
Heidegger). Following from this, the importance of the factical life of Christians will be 
uncovered and exemplified in Paul‘s Letters, allowing for the notion of kairological time 
to reveal itself. 
 Early rabbinic culture
229
 does not appear to have a concept of time per se; 
however, such an ―absence of time‖ is only observed when time is referred to as a 
―concept‖ put forth for philosophical or scientific inquiry.230 By thoroughly inspecting 
the existing early rabbinic literature, there appears to be no indication of philosophical or 
scientific discourse, hence time was never discussed.
231
 Perhaps the absence of 
philosophy and science and, by extension, the absence of the concept of time, is 
advantageous, i.e., the time phenomenon was not being concealed by philosophical and 
scientific discourses. The people were dealing with time in the manner of ―timing and 
time-reckoning.‖232 The timing of rituals and other human activities would have been 
central to life in early Jewish culture and, it can be argued, resulted in a particular 
comportment to the time phenomenon. That comportment is one that deals with time as it 
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is factically experienced in life as opposed to being covered over by philosophy and 
science. That is not to suggest that other ancient cultures did not recognize the 
importance of timing and time-reckoning; on the contrary, such timing and time-
reckoning is essential to human factical life experience. The difference is that alongside 
the development of philosophy and science—in attempting to make the time phenomenon 
clear—the time phenomenon was actually concealed further. As has been mentioned, no 
such discourses existed in early Judaism and thus they were able to deal with the time 
phenomenon as it reveals itself in factical life.  
In The Phenomenology of Religious Life, which includes Heidegger‘s 1920-21 
lecture course ―Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion,‖ Heidegger discusses 
Christian life experience and directly deals with Paul‘s Letters to the Galatians and 
Thessalonians. By examining these letters, Heidegger intends to uncover the factical life 
experience found primal Christianity.
233
 The word ―primal‖ is important—for it was 
thought that as Christianity became more widespread, even during Paul‘s life, it ―lost its 
apocalyptic edge.‖234 Furthermore, Heidegger was not interested in Christianity as a faith, 
but rather, as an example of how to live in a temporal manner.
235
 Heidegger is more 
focused on revealing a ―new paradigm of time‖ through an exemplification of Christian 
facticity.
236
 He does not wish to dwell on ―content‖ in a manner that his mentor Husserl 
did; on the contrary, Heidegger seeks to gain access to ―the original enactment process,‖ 
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which he uncovers in the factical life of those who became Christian.
237
 The importance 
of factical life experience cannot be over emphasized—for philosophy ―arises from‖ 
factical life experience and ―hinders philosophizing itself.‖238 As was discussed, factical 
life is lived, for the most part, in everydayness so it is evident that factical life is also 
responsible for hindering philosophical inquiries. Nevertheless, it is from factical life 
experience that philosophy must advance: 
We must ask, rather, what is temporality originally in factical life experience? 
What do past, present and future mean in factical life experience? Our way takes 
its point of departure from factical life, from which the meaning of time is won.
239
 
 
In other words, it is only by turning to facticity and analyzing how we factically 
experience time that the time phenomenon can be uncovered. This idea, that our way of 
access to the time phenomenon is through factical life (which was experienced by ancient 
Judaic people), is one that can be observed in early Christian texts as well. Such 
experience is historical and ―happens in time,‖ i.e., it is enacted in time.240 Heidegger 
maintains that ―Christian religiosity is in factical life experience,‖ that to be a Christian 
means to ―[live] temporality as such.‖241 The problem occurred when Aristotle‘s 
philosophy was incorporated into Scholasticism, which resulted in ―the deworlding of the 
factical world of primal Christianity.‖242 As was mentioned previously, philosophy ―fell 
prey‖ to the Greek method of ontotheology instead of going back to the original facticity 
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practised in ancient Judaism and more explicitly described in early Christian texts.
243
 One 
has to go back to these texts by challenging the dominant views (which also ―fell prey‖ to 
everydayness) that have been put forth by philosophers and historians alike. Luther‘s 
theologia crucis destructs the Greek theologia gloriae and ontologia gloriae claiming 
that such metaphysics ―turns everything upside-down.‖244 Heidegger was heavily 
influenced by Luther and much could be discussed regarding this influence;
245
 however, 
the objective here is to construct the time phenomenon—temporality.  
Heidegger‘s notions of ―falling,‖ ―inauthenticity‖ and ―authenticity‖ are 
elucidated in relation to the Christian experience.
246
 Obviously Heidegger is suggesting 
that the adoption of Aristotle‘s thought by later Christian thinkers (including Augustine) 
is an indication of the Christian falling into everydayness.
247
 When engaging with 
historical texts, these thinkers missed the appropriate position/attitude that must be 
adopted in order to get the past to speak to them.
248
 By contrast, Heidegger does not deal 
with ―the historical‖ as a ―science of history,‖ but rather he expresses the importance of 
encountering the historical ―in life.‖249 The historical proceeds in time and in factical life 
experience and thus, the historical object has to be dealt with as it is, i.e., as it changes in 
time. 
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The historical actually will, in each case modify itself according to the character 
of the object; and yet in principle the historical stays the same.
250
 
 
 The reason the historical will modify itself according to the character of the object is a 
result of the various representations of history, which are based on ―formative 
subjectivity.‖251 Such subjectivity—accounting for the multitude of ways of engaging 
with the past—is necessarily ―dependent upon a present.‖252 This brings us back to the 
importance of the present when discussing past ideas, i.e., each construal of the past is 
―orientated towards the present.‖253 It is essential that we not only take note of that 
present when delving into the past, but also that we incorporate the present into our 
analysis of a particular object—a hermeneutical analysis. Paul is exemplified, therefore, 
by Heidegger as one who is living and proclaiming authentic temporality. 
 Heidegger provides a modest biography of Paul. This biography, however, is not 
dealing with who Paul actually was, for no one can readily attain such information 
without relying on presuppositions (and perhaps even myths).
254
 On the contrary, 
Heidegger wishes to depict Paul in light of what can be interpreted from his letters, in 
particular, the factical life experiences that can be extracted from them. Paul lives during 
a time when the end of the world is believed to be near—Paul lives ―in extremis,‖ being-
towards-the-end.
255
 Heidegger‘s notion of authenticity is only experienced when one 
breaks from the everyday and comes face to face with one‘s potentiality for being, viz., 
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one‘s no-longer-being-in-the-world. Paul appears to be a perfect example of someone 
who is living with this exact comportment and, as a result, Paul lives ―within some 
definite form of temporality.‖256 Heidegger is therefore going back to Paul in order to 
attain an example of the life that is experiencing/living temporality.
257
 Heidegger‘s 
analysis of Paul‘s Letters reveals what it means to become Christian, i.e., Paul came to 
Christianity ―through an original experience.‖258 This experience is something that all 
Christians go through and accept. Paul, however, was faced with the problem of 
proclaiming ―the Christian life experience against the surrounding world.‖259 Christianity 
was a new religion and one that had to be communicated to the world (if it was going to 
succeed). Perhaps this need to communicate was one of the reasons why the time 
phenomenon—as it is factically experienced—was more explicitly described in primal 
Christianity, which did not occur in early Judaism. Communicating to others (whether it 
be with regards to religion, philosophy, science etc.), for the most part, causes the 
communicated discourse (talk) to fall into everydayness.
260
 What gets communicated gets 
lost in ―the they.‖ Due to its link to Judaism and the importance of original experience 
and acceptance, early Christians were able to withstand the everyday tendencies that 
many other thinkers throughout history fell prey to. Heidegger, therefore, examines the 
expressive modes of Paul: ―The Phenomenon of Proclamation,‖ which is the relation of 
Paul to himself, to the surrounding world and to the communal world.
261
 The ―how‖ of 
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proclamation must be assessed—the ―how‖ of being communicated—in order to 
understand the ―how‖ of the ―complex of enactments‖ along with their meaning.262  This 
is done by way of analysing Paul‘s Letters from factical life and revealing the 
phenomenological experience of the proclamation; hence, the letters will reveal 
something about Paul and ―his situation.‖ This is the biography that Heidegger is seeking 
and not his upbringing and adult life issues. The factical life situation that Paul finds 
himself in and ―how‖ he communicates this to himself, the surrounding world and the 
communal world is revealed in his letters.
263
 This emphasizes the importance of starting 
from factical life experience, something that has been the initial starting point of this 
entire analysis—for it is only by beginning with this that we can attain original access to 
the time phenomenon. 
Paul‘s situation is one that gets ―co-experienced‖ with his experience of his 
congregation. The way that Paul experiences the Thessalonians is, at the same time, the 
way that he experiences himself—for he experiences himself in his experience of 
them.
264
 Therefore, the congregation‘s ―having-become‖ (Christian) is Paul‘s ―having-
become‖ (Christian).265 This is not difficult to understand once the basic tenet of 
Christianity is reveal.  
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You have accepted the how of the Christian standard of living, etc. that which is 
accepted concerns the how of self-conduct in factical life.
266
   
 
―To become‖ a Christian means ―to accept‖ a certain life; however, there is more to this 
acceptance than simply this way of living.
267
 In fact, this acceptance is profoundly 
connected to time. By having knowledge of our own ―having-become,‖ we are then able 
to experience our ―being-present,‖ which carries great significance for our anticipation of 
the future.
268
 The idea in Christianity is that we are ―turning-towards God‖ in a manner 
where we factically enact specific ways of being, e.g., ―serving‖ and ―waiting.‖269 To be 
a Christian means to live in a manner that is serving God and, as well, to await the 
Parousia—the second coming of the lord.270 The importance of the second coming lies in 
the fact that there was a first coming, that Christ came and this arrival is what is accepted 
by Christians—Christ came and will come again at the end of the world. Living with such 
a burden—awaiting the end—―determines each moment of [Paul‘s] life.‖271 Paul‘s life is 
basically ―stretched out between the first and second coming.‖272  
It is apparent in his letters that he feels the need to reinforce this fact, for some in 
his congregation have not been living appropriately, i.e., they are absorbed in the world 
of their concern and have become expectant of ―what life brings them.‖273 They have 
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forgotten where they came from by forgetting where they are headed and Paul feels 
impelled to bring the ―Thessalonians back to themselves,‖ back to the knowledge of their 
having-become.
274
 This idea of remembering one‘s own becoming and awaiting one‘s 
own impending future is structurally comparable to Heidegger‘s notion of authentic time. 
Paul even attempts to ―free the Thessalonians from a common place understanding of 
time,‖ which is remarkably similar to Heidegger‘s notion of unconcealment—allowing 
for something else to reveal itself once the destruction of the dominant view has 
ensued.
275
 Time, according to Paul, has to be thought of in a different way in light of the 
inevitable ‗end times:‘ 
Paul is urging his congregation to adopt an appropriate bearing towards the great 
coming event. Heidegger‘s reading . . . is especially alert to the bearing which the 
Christian must have towards the future, which brings with it a special bearing 
towards the past.
276
 
 
It is clear that, unlike Aristotle, Paul is not privileging the present but is, in fact, 
privileging this notion of being-towards-the-end—eschatology. With the end 
(apocalypse) in view one is able to come back to one‘s present, which is highlighted and 
experienced differently. By living in a manner where one‘s bearing is such that (at any 
moment) the end may come, one is able to experience every (present) moment more 
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profoundly and venerated.
277
  One has to live with a certain ―relation to the eschaton, the 
final situation.‖278  
For Heidegger, it is being-toward-death, towards-one‘s-ownmost-potentiality-for-
being that one comes face to face with. Facing this future, i.e., the nullity of being or the 
―possibility of the impossibility of being,‖ one is then able to come back to the present 
and, as a result, live in the present with a different orientation toward the past and the 
future. Put simply, by anticipating one‘s own finitude (death), one lives in the present 
with a ―resolve,‖ an acceptance and even a willing of one‘s ownmost being (or non-
being).
279
 This resolve is akin to Paul‘s description of the appropriate attitude that one 
has to adopt towards the future; an attitude that willingly accepts that Christ came and 
will come again.
280
 For such an attitude towards an event past and an event still to come 
(the return of the same event) will determine our attitude toward the present, i.e., 
anticipatory resoluteness.
281
 Such a resolution is that which ―reveals the corner stone of 
the self as nothingness:‖ for Heidegger, the self was not-being (in-the-world) and will 
cease to-be (in-the-world); for Paul, Christ came (into the world) and will come (into the 
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world) again.
282
 To be awake and mindful of the impending futural coming (the return of 
the same), means to be necessarily experiencing anxiety in the face of this event.
283
  
It opens up a horizon of meaning only for those with the courage to feel anxiety 
and persevere in front of nothingness. Only in this way can we be authentic.
284
 
 
Paul must remind the Thessalonians of this fact, for he does not wish to see anyone in his 
congregation caught off guard like ―a thief in the night.‖285 None of this would be 
possible, however, if it were not for primordial temporality, which makes our experiences 
of expectation, anxiety, anticipation etc., possible.  
3.2: Primordial Temporality   
Primordial temporality can only be uncovered once the everyday conception of time that 
has concealed this primordial temporality has been exposed. In fact, ―they‖ have not only 
concealed this notion, but rather, they have themselves sprung from primordial 
temporality. Before primordial temporality can be explicated clearly, a brief commentary 
on how an analysis can bring forth this more original notion of time. For one thing, how 
does anticipatory resoluteness, which was ontically demonstrated in primal Christianity, 
link to an ontology of being? As was described above, anticipatory resoluteness is a 
specific attitude that one can adopt and live with; however, can an attitude lead to an 
ontology? Heidegger makes a distinction between ontic and ontological or existentiell 
and existential, which accounts for our worldly experiences (ontic/existentiell) on the one 
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hand and our essential being (ontological/existential) on the other.
286
 Simply describing 
an existentiell situation does not appear to give one the authority to make existential or 
ontological determinations. On the contrary, this is precisely what Heidegger wishes to 
establish: how we get to the ontological is specifically by way of the ontic, thus the 
ontological must be grounded in the ontic.
287
 The very questioning of being—the 
existentiell act of posing a question—is what opens up the possibility of inquiring into 
and uncovering a fundamental ontology. Therefore, ―ontological conceptualization 
[should] not let itself be cut off from our ontical experiences.‖288  
 From what has been delineated, it is clear that temporality plays a significant role 
for Dasein. This is more than simply an extension in which nothing but the present exists. 
Rather this demonstrates that the past and the future play just as considerable a role as the 
present does for Dasein. It may be suggested that the past and future are more vital than 
the present—for the present, like Aristotle said, becomes the link between the past and 
future. For Heidegger, however, this link is not something to be privileged or elevated, in 
fact, it is the time component that we leave in order to go back to the past and anticipate 
the future. One does not dwell in the present without notions of the past and future. The 
present is actually lived with a perception of the past and future in mind, i.e., one‘s 
comportment towards the past and future will determine one‘s present. One‘s present is 
therefore dependent on the past and future in such a way that one could not act in the 
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present without a relation to the past and future. Ontically, of course, people get on in the 
world without prefect retention of the past and without a prefect understanding of the 
future. However, even such forgetting and lack of expecting is a relation. A relation to the 
past in the form of forgetting is what constitutes everydayness, which, as has been 
discussed, is how we get on in the world for the most part. Equally, a relation to the 
future in the form of expecting is what constitutes everydayness. Finally, a relation to the 
present that is curiously distracted by things in the world is also what constitutes 
everydayness. It then follows that if such relations were severed, then one could not 
function in the world either authentically or inauthentically. Thus, the common 
understanding of time is nothing more than a forgetting of a more primordial temporality. 
Forgetting is only possible provided that a more primordial notion of temporality exists— 
for that is precisely what gets forgotten in everydayness. Interestingly, in Aristotle‘s 
discussion of time, a notion of forgetting can be found: 
In time all things come into being and pass away; for which reason some called it 
the wisest of all things, but the Pythagorean Paron called it the most stupid, 
because in it we also forget; and his was the truer view.
289
 
 
Of course Aristotle‘s notion of forgetting may not necessarily be the same forgetting that 
Heidegger discusses; however, the fact that it is time which is being held responsible for 
the forgetting is intriguing. We cannot forget unless we have time in which the forgetting 
can occur. This is what primordial temporality is, the enabling of experiences of ‗earlier,‘ 
‗at this moment,‘ and ‗after‘ in which the phenomena of ‗forgetting‘/‘retaining,‘ ‗making 
present‘/‘moment of vision‘ and ‗expecting‘/‘anticipating‘ occur.  
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All ontological propositions can be regarded as ―a priori propositions,‖ which 
means that they require an idea of ―an earlier.‖290 Such an idea is only possible provided 
that there is a conception of temporality—―the earlier‖ could not exist without already 
having a notion of time that allows for there to be an earlier in the first place.
291
 It must 
therefore be concluded that temporality is the condition for the possibility of the 
earlier.
292
 Interestingly, as was revealed in the reduction, Augustine believes that prior to 
heaven and earth there had to have been something that enabled the words of creation to 
be delivered, and that something was succession and alteration. Time, for Augustine, was 
necessary for finite beings to be brought into existence; time became the condition for the 
possibility of heaven and earth. Likewise with Aristotle (who utilized the unmoved 
mover to explain the beginning of motion), time being linked to motion therefore 
becomes the condition for the possibility of things. Furthermore, the Greek god Chronos 
(time) created the other deities from out of his seed thus allowing for the creation of other 
beings. These ontotheological notions of the genesis of time, which have been heavily 
criticized, appear to re-emerge in connection with Heidegger‘s primordial temporality. Of 
course, Heidegger was not so bold as to assume a creation myth to explain primordial 
temporality. Heidegger remains phenomenological in his account, i.e., primordial 
temporality is a notion that we always already have in order to be able to navigate in the 
world.  
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These ideas dealing with time in an everyday/inauthentic manner uncovered in the 
past reveal this fact: that they must have a notion of primordial temporality in order for 
them to be able to put forth their everyday/inauthentic time stories. 
Roughly speaking, use of time is made in the understanding of being, without pre-
philosophical and non-philosophical Dasein knowing about it explicitly.
293
 
 
The fact that time is always already there, with or without our knowledge of it, indicates 
that this primordial ―time temporalizes itself as the absolutely earliest.‖294 How could one 
conduct a historical analysis if no notion of ‗before,‘ ‗prior,‘ ‗previous,‘ ‗earlier‘ etc., 
were available? The wonders of writing, reading and mathematics would not be possible 
if ideas such as ‗after,‘ ‗later,‘ ‗soon,‘ ‗subsequent‘ etc., were not accessible. Of course 
there could be no present—for how could the present be present if there were no notions 
of before or after with which to contrast the present with? Therefore, Heidegger 
maintains that these notions are ones that are there, in our being; we have this idea, 
notion, and experience of ‗earlier,‘ ‗at this moment‘ and ‗after.‘  
Thus the fundamental ontological task of interpreting being as such includes 
working out the Temporality of Being. In the exposition of the problematic of 
Temporality the question of the meaning of being will first be concretely 
answered.
295
  
 
This is exactly what primordial temporality does: it opens up the possibility of concretely 
answering the question of the meaning of being. Furthermore, it opens up the possibility 
of possibility itself—for ―the origin of possibility‖ is time.296  Therefore, being is not only 
lived ―in time,‖ i.e., in the manner that Augustine depicts with his distinction between 
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 Heidegger, Being and Time, 40. See also Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 280 & 294. 
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 Ibid., 325. 
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God‘s eternal present and human beings‘ temporal experiences, but rather being is 
time.
297
 Time makes possible the ability to be-ahead-of-oneself, the ability to have/take 
time in order to . . . , and the ability to go back one‘s having-been—authentically and 
inauthentically.
298
 Being is only graspable with respect to time, hence even notions of 
―supra-temporal,‖ ―non-temporal‖ and eternal are actually temporal insofar as they are 
made possible due to our knowledge of primordial temporarily.
299
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 Heidegger, Being and Time, 40. See also Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, 319: ―The being, in 
which Dasein can be its wholeness authentically as being-ahead-of-itself, is time.‖ 
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Conclusion 
Phenomenological accounts of time reveal themselves to us in the ideas of past thinkers 
like Augustine and Paul. This was established by engaging in a hermeneutical analysis of 
these ideas and not by simply restating what ―they‖ have already and explicitly said about 
time. If the intent of this analysis was to discuss Augustine and Paul in a traditional 
manner, i.e., to attempt to understand how they understood their own ideas (in their own 
temporally particular situation), then this analysis would have gone astray. Fortunately 
this was not my endeavour. I sought to go back to these thinkers with a particular 
comportment and with a particular motivation—to better understand the phenomenology 
of time as it was laid out by Heidegger. In order to attain this better understanding—as 
was proposed in the beginning and demonstrated throughout this analysis—a return to 
Augustine and Paul was necessary. This return revealed that Heidegger‘s account of time 
is not something that emerged out of nowhere; on the contrary, the roots of his thought 
can be located in these past ideas.  
Thus, Heidegger‘s phenomenological account of time is historical. Heidegger did 
not simply take these ideas and appropriate them for his own gain, although a certain 
level of appropriation was necessary. What has been demonstrated, rather, is that others 
throughout history can be seen to be dealing with time as it is revealed in factical life 
experience, albeit unbeknownst to them. The fact that these ideas have been discussed 
throughout history, i.e., the fact that facticity was dealt with in relation to time in the past, 
reveals that facticity is the appropriate initial position to adopt when investigating time. 
Even though Augustine and Paul did not necessarily recognize their work to be based on 
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(or coming from) a notion of factical life, they nevertheless dealt with the phenomenon of 
time as it is factically experienced. This is what the return to their ideas has revealed—by 
revisiting the ideas of Augustine and Paul with our initial position in mind, it can be 
demonstrated that factical life was in fact motivating their analyses. They may not have 
been aware of this motivation, but it is something that can be concluded from this 
analysis.  
Heidegger used Aristotle‘s notion of time as the everyday example with the intent 
of demonstrating that the discussion of time had not gone beyond Aristotle‘s account. 
The everyday way of interpreting time can be seen in Aristotle‘s construal of time and as 
well in other philosophers‘ accounts, such as Augustine. By using another philosopher, 
viz., Augustine, instead of Aristotle, I was able to show the Aristotelian influence within 
Augustine‘s everyday conception of time. Interestingly, Aristotle has been held 
responsible for stunting the investigation into time and, furthermore, the influence he had 
on Scholasticism appeared to hinder their progress. Aristotle has been recognized, in 
addition, for delaying the sciences with his theory of motion, which is the primary reason 
why the geocentric model of the universe endured for centuries.
300
 It was Galileo who 
disproved Aristotle‘s theory of motion, which allowed for the new (or not so new) view 
of the universe to unconceal itself.
301
 It is important to see the profound influence that 
Aristotle had on history, not only with respect to philosophy, but even within the 
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sciences. It can be asserted, then, that by investigating other historical figures, such as 
Augustine, the authority that Aristotle appears to have had (with regards to philosophy 
and science) can be easily discerned.  
Augustine put forth a cosmic account of time in which he dealt with its origins. 
By adopting such a position towards time, i.e., by investigating its origins, Augustine 
repeated what many before him (throughout history) had done. Going back to the 
Presocratics, we can find (with the monist thinkers in particular), cosmological accounts 
of the origins of existence that resemble, at least in principle, the account that Augustine 
provides. Obviously, as it should be noted, the Presocratics did not discuss the origins of 
the universe for the sake of uncovering an account of time, as Augustine seem to do. 
However, the idea of an indefinite or eternal substance being the condition for the 
possibility of all that exists is markedly similar to Augustine‘s account of Genesis 
(clearly linked to the Bible). Many other everyday inclinations can be found in 
Augustine‘s cosmic account of time—being wholly unaware of his initial position of 
looking, the investigative constraints that he ignores (constraining him further), and even 
the presupposition of an additional constraint. Augustine has concealed the time 
phenomenon due to these traditional everyday interpretations and presuppositions; an 
example of the ―tendency to cover over.‖302 By disseminating traditional ideas regarding 
existence, Augustine‘s account of time has fallen into everydayness. On the other hand, 
Augustine did put forth an account of time that appears to have dealt with the time 
phenomenon as it reveals itself to us. The extension of the soul recognizes the way in 
                                                          
302
 Heidegger, ―Wilhelm Dilthey‘s Research,‖ 165. 
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which human beings actually experience time by remembering/forgetting, being 
immediately aware and expecting. This had profound implications for philosophy, even if 
those implications were only recognized in later centuries. That is why I decided to break 
up Augustine‘s account of time into two different accounts, the cosmic account and the 
phenomenological account. Both are supposed to make time clear (as a single account of 
time); however, as has been asserted throughout this analysis, only with the extension of 
the soul does Augustine deals with the time phenomenon, whereas the other merely 
perpetuates the Aristotelian model of ‗now time.‘  
Augustine and Paul were selected due to their link to Christianity, which altered 
how we deal with time. Ancient Rabbinic culture did not have a concept of time as such; 
however, living and dealing with time—time-reckoning—was vital, which may have 
assisted them in avoiding the everyday interpretation. That is not to suggest that they did 
not fall prey to everydayness, for that is a basic constitution of Dasein and is unavoidable. 
What this does suggest, however, is that they were not further concealing and covering up 
the time phenomenon with philosophical/scientific explanations in an attempt to make it 
clear. Such a comportment towards time clearly influenced early Christian life 
experience, which can be located in Paul‘s Letters. It is in these letters that factical life 
experience, along with the authentic and appropriate attitude toward time, was uncovered 
and discussed in a way that makes it relevant for Heidegger. Not only did Heidegger 
recognize the importance of early Christian life experience, but, as many have suggested, 
even his own account of time appears to be grounded in this Christian life experience. It 
would be wrong to assert that this ground is something that went unrecognized by 
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Heidegger, for he would have been fully aware of the structural similarities. Perhaps he 
merely sought to find the most appropriate schematism of time in order to gain original 
access to the time phenomenon. Once he attained this schematism he was then able to 
detach it from its traditional worldview associated with Christianity and properly 
appropriate it. This is what fundamentally allowed Heidegger to develop his 
phenomenological account of time leading to primordial temporality. Once revealed, 
primordial temporality is not something that needs to be proven—no genesis of the 
creation of this phenomenon is necessary. The simple fact is that we have it and it 
determines our being, our existence.  
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